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Abstract
This paper analyzes periods of economic stagnation in a panel of countries.
We test if stagnation episodes are predicted by institutional factors and
external/internal shocks, as is implied by recent theoretical contributions, and
compare the impacts of these variables with those of traditional macroeconomic
variables. We examine the determinants of stagnation episodes using multivariate
dynamic linear models, fixed-effects logit models, and dynamic random effects
probit models. In addition, we analyze whether the included variables have different
impacts on the onset of a stagnation episode than on its continuation. We find
that inflation, negative regime changes, real exchange rate undervaluation, financial
openness, and trade openness explain the incidence of stagnation spells. Only in the
case of trade openness, there is robust evidence of a differential impact; it reduces
the probability of falling into a stagnation spell, but has a weaker effect within
a spell. All models account for unobserved heterogeneity and exhibit a moderate
degree of positive state-dependence.
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1 Introduction
Since the 1950s, most countries across the globe have experienced substantial welfare
gains brought about by many years of positive economic growth and declining birth
rates. However, while in the developed world these welfare gains are mainly the result
of steady positive growth rates, GDP per capita growth in developing countries has been
much more erratic and volatile. Most emerging economies have experienced periods
of economic stagnation between positive growth spurts and for several countries the
absence of sustained growth has proved to be a persistent phenomenon, often lasting for
several years or even decades. Explaining why some countries experience more periods of
stagnation than others may thus prove essential to the understanding of contemporary
differences in levels of GDP per capita.
Rather than focusing on differences in average growth rates, recent research
increasingly aims to unveil the specific characteristics of accelerating growth, stagnation,
or decline. This paper addresses two research questions within this wider agenda. First,
we ask if institutional characteristics and external/internal shocks determine the incidence
of stagnation spells, and compare these effects to a set of macroeconomic variables. This
question specifically tests the implications of a recent contribution by North, Wallis and
Weingast (2009), who – among others – argue that economic collapses are affected by
the ability of institutions to deal with various external and internal shocks challenging
the prevailing distribution of economic rents and power. Second, we analyze if any of the
included variables have a different impact on the onset of a stagnation episode than on its
continuation. In other words, we examine if the factors affecting the probability of falling
into stagnation are the same as those affecting the probability of continuing stagnation.
Most of the empirical literature on growth episodes uses static models to study factors
that are correlated with the onset of a certain growth episode and, more recently, began
to also examine factors associated with the duration of a given episode. Our contribution
is to analyze stagnation spells as a dynamic problem, subject to state-dependence and
interactions between the lagged state and the independent variables. Contrary to other
studies, this approach allows the probability of stagnation to depend on whether a country
was already in stagnation (state-dependence) and lets the data decide if the included
variables have a different effect on the onset of a stagnation episode compared to its
continuation, rather than separating these two ex ante. We estimate the dynamic models
using fixed-effects linear probability models, GMM, fixed-effects logit and a dynamic
random effects probit estimator proposed by Wooldridge (2005).
Our results indicate that political regime changes towards autocracy strongly affect
the occurrence of stagnation episodes, while other proxies for institutions and shocks
do not. Consequently, we find little support for theories along the lines of North et
al. (2009). Instead, macroeconomic factors explain the onset of stagnation episodes
rather well, but could themselves be endogenous to institutional characteristics. Higher
inflation positively predicts subsequent stagnation episodes, while financial openness,
trade openness and real exchange rate undervaluation are associated with less economic
declines. Further, we find little evidence that the effects of these variables differ between
the onset and continuation of stagnation spells. Only trade openness has robustly different
effects. It has a large negative effect on the chances of falling into stagnation, but this
effect vanishes and in some models switches signs during stagnation spells. In addition,
we find that stagnation spells exhibit a moderate degree of state-dependence, which is
consistent with other results in the literature on the duration of growth collapses.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews literature
on institutions and growth, and discusses applications of the growth episodes approach.
Section 3 defines stagnation episodes and explores their correlations with GDP levels and
institutions. Section 4 describes the variables and data construction. Section 5 outlines
the empirical methods. Section 6 discusses the results, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
This paper primarily relates to two literatures. On the one hand, our research is guided
by the findings of the theoretical and empirical literature on institutions and long-run
growth. Specifically, a recent contribution by North et al. (2009) drew our attention to
the importance of periods of per capita income stagnation in explaining long economic
divergence (see the review in Bluhm and Szirmai, 2012). On the other hand, this paper
is part of a burgeoning empirical literature on growth episodes and trend breaks.
An increasingly large body of literature in economics argues that differences in
institutional characteristics are the key to understanding the discrepancy in long-run
economic performances. While modern institutional theory has many antecedents, it
builds on the hypothesis that well-developed property rights institutions could explain the
historical rise of the West (e.g. North and Thomas, 1973). Since the 1990s, this literature
has since been extended to view growth-promoting institutions less narrowly. Recent
contributions argue, for example, that institutions for growth are multifaceted (Rodrik,
2000), interact with geography and inequality (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997), develop
semi-endogenously (Greif, 2006) and are deeply embedded in informal arrangements
(North et al., 2009; Khan, 2010).1
In terms of econometric evidence, several papers have suggested that differences in
institutions explain a large part – if not the largest part – of the cross-country variation
in levels of GDP per capita.2 However, many of these studies have also been criticized
for their underlying assumptions (e.g. Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes and Shleifer,
2004) and do generally not establish a link between institutions and growth rates (Meisel
and Ould Aoudia, 2008; de Crombrugghe and Farla, 2011). This is less puzzling than it
may initially seem. A widely accepted fact is that institutional change is a slow process,
often occurring over decades or even longer time horizons. For empirical studies this has
a simple implication, more or less time-invariant characteristics are usually somewhat
better-suited to explain differences in levels than variation in differences.
Potentially bridging this gap in theory, several authors have recently suggested that
there is a link between various external/internal shocks to a country’s institutions and
different growth outcomes. North et al. (2009), for example, identify two distinct regimes
of stability, which they call ‘social orders’. Open access orders are economically and
politically highly developed, experience relatively smooth patterns of economic growth,
have active civil societies, many long-lived organizations, heavily formalized rules, and
strong rule-of-law. Large segments of the population have access to political and economic
organizations and activities. Limited access orders, on the contrary, are dominated by
elites that exclude large parts of the population from access to economic and political
organizations. The rents created in this process are then distributed among members
1For a review of the debates see Bluhm and Szirmai (2012) and for an earlier survey see Aron (2000).
2This list of empirical studies investigating this issue is long and growing, but the seminal papers are
Knack and Keefer (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002) and
Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004).
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of the ruling coalition. However, this distribution of rents among a select few has a
deeper purpose, it serves to achieve a basic degree of social stability and control over
violence. Limited access orders are characterized by volatile growth patterns, polities
without broad democratic consent, few organizations, informal rules, weak and unequally
enforced rule-of-law, insecure property rights and high levels of inequality.
North et al. (2009) suggest that limited access orders and open access orders deal
differently with external or internal shocks to the distribution of rents and power among
the ruling elites. Compared to open access orders, the institutions and rent-sharing
agreements of limited access orders are inflexible and less able to contain conflict, thus
causing a higher propensity towards growth collapses and stagnation. Khan (2010)
provides a theory of rent sharing and highlights a growth-stability trade off in developing
countries arising from institutionalized rent/power-sharing, but stresses the role of
informal institutions and the relative size of the informal sector in the economy. Rodrik
(1999) provides an early version of a theory of the relationship between institutions and
growth collapses. He links negative growth experiences to terms of trade shocks, latent
social conflict and the ability of institutions to contain conflict and absorb the destructive
potential of such shocks. A key question for this paper is to what extent our analysis of
stagnation episodes empirically supports these theories. Therefore, we hypothesize that
(a) that institutional characteristics play an important role in explaining the onset of
stagnation and (b) weak institutions prolong the incidence of stagnation spells.
As Pritchett (1998) pointed out, a substantial problem in traditional panel studies of
growth rates is that they rely on identifying one average trend, while in reality growth is
often erratic and may constitute very different growth regimes. This conjecture gave birth
to a rapidly growing literature, which since has analyzed growth differentials (Rodrik,
1999), growth accelerations (Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik, 2005), switching among
growth regimes (Jerzmanowski, 2006), the duration of growth collapses (Hausmann,
Rodriguez and Wagner, 2008), start and stop growth (Jones and Olken, 2008), real income
stagnation (Reddy and Minoiu, 2009) and the duration of upward trend breaks in growth
(Berg, Ostry and Zettelmeyer, 2011).3
This paper relates most to the studies focusing on negative growth experiences. Rodrik
(1999), for example, analyzes differences in growth rates between decades and differences
before and after trend breaks to explain growth collapses. His contribution does not
yet explore which factors relate to the incidence of these collapses, but analyzes the
differences in growth rates between two growth regimes. He provides first evidence that
growth collapses are linked to terms of trade shocks, latent conflict and the conflict
management capacity of institutions. Hausmann et al. (2008) examine the onset and
duration of growth collapses. They mainly find that weak export performance and high
inflation coincide with the beginning of stagnation, but downturns also occur together
with wars, sudden stops of capital inflows and political transitions. However, most of
these factors have little influence of the duration of collapses, which only appears to be
correlated with a measure of the flexibility of a country’s export basket. Last, Reddy and
Minoiu (2009) investigate stagnation spells and find that these are correlated with weak
export performance, low investment, primary commodity exports and weak institutions.
The study of stagnation spells and other negative growth episodes is also related to the
business cycle literature and the literature on economic crises. Although the focus of this
3Also considering studies with a regional focus extends this list substantially: for different parts of
Africa see Pattillo et al. (2005), Arbache and Page (2007), and Imam and Salinas (2008), or for growth
decelerations at middle income levels with a focus on China see Eichengreen, Park and Shin (2011).
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paper is primarily on longer-run growth episodes and not on short-run fluctuations, these
literatures provide relevant insights and hypotheses. For example, Diebold, Rudebusch
and Sichel (1993) find that postwar business cycle contractions exhibit positive duration
dependence4, while Cerra and Saxena (2008) show that after severe financial crises and
wars growth does often not fully recover to its pre-crisis trend.
Many papers in the growth episodes literature use a methodology that can be
summarized in two steps. First, a filter is applied to the data to identify single or multiple
breaks in the time-series that is either rule-based or statistical. If the filter is rule-based,
then often it includes a criterion defining the length of the spell, although this need not
be the case. If the filter is econometric, then it may find more than one break in the
data and thus lead to distinct episodes or growth regimes. Second, correlates with the
onset of these episodes are examined by either testing differences in means of potentially
correlated variables (across the onset), or by estimating probit models.
Interestingly, apart from Jerzmanowski’s (2006) regime-switching models, none of
these studies consider the incidence of a growth episode as a dynamic problem. Only
Hausmann et al. (2008) and Berg et al. (2011) focus on the duration of collapses and thus
use information of how long an episode lasts, but other studies generally disregard this
information. We will address this method in more detail later, but essentially it assumes
that the factors affecting the onset of an episode are not the same as those determining if
an episode will continue. Further, most studies of growth episodes take very few measures
to limit the endogeneity of the included regressors, which leaves unaddressed whether they
are causes of or caused by the episode of interest.
3 Growth episodes and long-run growth
3.1 Defining the growth episodes
Our classification of growth episodes is closely related to the contribution of Hausmann
et al. (2008) and to their definition of what constitutes growth collapses. We modify
and extend their approach in two ways. First, we begin with their definition of a
growth collapse, but find that the term stagnation episode more adequately describes
the underlying phenomenon. Second, based on our definition of a stagnation episode, we
then derive an entire classification of growth experiences.
We define a stagnation episode (or stagnation spell) as an event that begins with a
contraction of GDP per capita (Yit) in country i in year t and lasts until GDP per capita
is again at or above its pre-episode level. A stagnation episode begins if and only if the
level of GDP per capita in the year before the candidate year t is also at the maximum
level within the time-series of the country. Defined formally, a stagnation episode begins
when Yit < Yi,t−1 and Yi,t−1 ≥ maxt−1x=t0 Yi,x, and lasts until Yi,t+p ≥ Yi,t−1, where p ≥ 1.
Conversely, we define all years when a country is not stagnating as expansion episodes. In
other words, an expansion begins the first year a country has left or not yet experienced
a stagnation spell and lasts until the beginning of the next stagnation.
Apart from being very simple, these definitions have many desirable properties. In
theory, a completed stagnation episode has a net effect of zero on the level of GDP
per capita, since it includes both the downturn and the associated recovery. Similarly,
4An event exhibits positive duration dependence is it is more likely to end the longer it lasts
(increasing hazard) and negative duration dependence if it is more likely to continue (declining hazard).
Hence, positive duration dependence corresponds to negative state-dependence and vice versa.
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defining expansions as the mirror image of stagnation episodes implies that the effect of
an expansion episode on the level of GDP per capita is always positive. We explicitly
exclude growth that is merely restoring what was lost in past crises, as this growth does
not account for long-run increases in GDP per capita. Some commonly used filters,
such as Hausmann et al.’s (2005) growth accelerations filter, do not explicitly make this
distinction between recoveries and expansions (or accelerations), and thus potentially
identify episodes that are at least in part recoveries.
Our filter is “time free”, in the sense that it does not impose a maximum length onto
the episodes. Since we use annual data, any episode has a minimum duration of one
year but can actually last for the entire length of the sampled period (1951–2007). Based
on this definition, we can identify long stagnation episodes that may include recurring
short-run recessions with incomplete recoveries – incomplete in the sense of not meeting
the criterion of exceeding the maximum level of GDP per capita prior to the crisis. These
stagnation episodes thus exclude many business cycle fluctuations.5
For a better understanding of the dynamics within these two broader episodes, we
further differentiate each of them into two sub-spells. In the case of stagnation episodes,
we distinguish between crises, lasting from the beginning of the stagnation episode to
the trough, and recoveries, lasting from the year after the trough until the end of the
stagnation spell. We define the trough to occur at the minimum level of output occurring
during a stagnation episode. In the case of expansions, we distinguish between moderate
expansions with an average growth rate less or equal than 5% per annum and rapid
expansions with an average growth rate greater than 5% per annum.6
[Figure 1 about here]
Figure 1 illustrates how our filter works graphically as applied to Angola and France.
This example is typical for the different growth experiences of developed and developing
countries and shows that the filter works reasonably well in identifying the episodes of
interest. While Angola has had many years of positive growth throughout the sample
period, we find only three short expansion spells of which only the last is a rapid
expansion. Instead, most of the time, Angola was in one protracted stagnation episode
lasting from 1975 until the end of 2004, which included significant volatility in between.
On the contrary, the French economy grew steadily since 1951 and is characterized by
protracted periods of moderate expansion, which are only temporarily interrupted by
short stagnation spells. Given these two stylized cases, the incidence of stagnation spells
may thus explain a large part of the difference in long-run levels of GDP per capita.
Figure 1 also highlights that some stagnation spells only consist of a crisis without an
associated recovery, which arises due to a technical issue. Since we rely on annual data,
we are not able to distinguish a recovery from an expansion year if growth in the recovery
year immediately after the trough is rapid enough to put GDP per capita above its
pre-stagnation episode maximum. In order to not overestimate the length of stagnation
episodes, we consider such years as part of expansions and not part of recoveries. For
this reason, some crisis episodes are immediately followed by an expansion, without an
5This is the main difference with business cycle analysis. We are not interested in fluctuations around
a trend, but negative deviations from the preceding trend and cases in which growth does not fit the
business cycle perspective.
6More precisely, we measure the growth rate across an expansion as: g¯t,t+q = q
−1[lnYi,t−1+q− lnYit],
where q is the duration of the expansion. We classify an episode as rapid if g¯t,t+q > 0.05, and slow to
moderate if g¯t,t+q ≤ 0.05.
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intervening recovery.7 This decision should have little influence on our estimates in
the empirical section of this paper, as we are primarily concerned with explaining the
occurrence of stagnation episodes and not with their duration.
3.2 Growth profiles
While the main focus of this paper is on the dynamics of moving in and out of stagnation
spells, we first take a more detailed look at questions relating to the distribution of growth
episodes across countries and time. Does the occurrence of stagnation episodes explain
large parts of the difference in GDP per capita among the developed and developing world
today? Or similarly, as North et al. (2009) and others have suggested, do low income
countries grow rapidly very often but lose the benefits because fast growth is offset by a
higher propensity to experience collapses? For example, a key finding of Hausmann et al.
(2005) is that growth is easy to ignite even in low-income countries but more difficult to
sustain thereafter. Using the previously defined growth episodes, Table 1 addresses these
issues in more detail.
[Table 1 about here]
We report two panels in Table 1. The upper panel groups the relative incidence
of each type of growth episode from 1951 to 2007 by quartiles of GDP per capita in
2007. The lower panel uses income groups in 1960 for comparison. Interestingly, the
picture emerging from these two classifications is very different. When we group the
distribution of growth episodes by end-of-sample income classes, we find that low income
countries spend most of their time in stagnation, upper middle income countries almost
half the time and high income countries only about a quarter. In other words, this
suggests that the different propensity to experience stagnation spells is closely linked
to development outcomes today. Further, using the finer classification of four distinct
growth episodes, we find that a high proportion of crises at low and lower middle income
levels are driving this relationship. However, once we exclude recoveries from the positive
growth experiences, there is little indication that lower income countries grow rapidly very
often or possibly even more often than high income countries. In fact, the opposite seems
to be the case. While countries in the lowest income group spend relatively more of their
expansions growing rapidly (10.21/22.12 ≈ 46.15%), higher income countries spend more
time growing rapidly in total. Even in absolute terms, out of all the rapid expansions in
the sample only 14.58% accrue to the lowest income group, 16.90% to the lower middle
income group, but 33.98% to the upper middle group and 34.54% to the highest income
group in 2007. Table 1 confirms the finding of North et al. (2009) that presently poor
countries have experienced less years of positive growth than rich countries. However, it
contradicts their assertion that once poor countries grow, they do so more rapidly than
their rich counterparts. The main reason for this difference is the exclusion of recovery
years from years of positive growth.
7This complication also in part explains why we do not use the disaggregate definitions as a basis
for the empirical analysis. For unfinished stagnation episodes, there is considerable uncertainty if the
currently observed trough (beginning of the recovery) will actually remain the trough of the stagnation
episode if we were to observe it until its end. In other words, both the length of the crisis period and
the beginning of the recovery may be subject to change when data on more recent years come available.
However, for stagnation episodes as a whole there is no ambiguity towards their beginning, therefore
they do not suffer from this problem.
7
Nevertheless, the findings in Table 1 could be driven by a tautology. The income level
at the end of the sample is, by definition, affected by the number and length of stagnation
episodes a country experienced during the sample period. The bottom panel of Table 1
circumvents this problem by grouping the episodes across income classes in 1960, which
is closer to the beginning of the sample.8 Some of the results are similar to the top panel,
but others are radically different. The similarities are that rich countries spend much
less of their time in crisis and much more of their time in expansions. However, the
distinction between low and middle income classes almost completely disappears and the
only pronounced differences that remain are between high income countries and the rest.
High income countries in 1960 spent about 30% of their time in stagnation from 1951
to 2007, while middle and low income countries stagnated more than half of the time.
Similarly, the incidence of crises no longer declines almost linearly with higher income
groups but remains at about a third for the lowest two income group, slightly below a
third for the upper middle income group and below 20% for the highest income group.
Further, the findings of Hausmann et al. (2005) receive more support when we use the
beginning-of-sample income groups. Lower and middle income countries spend relatively
more time in rapid expansions than high income countries, but this difference is not very
large and most pronounced only for lower middle income countries. If we examine the
distribution of all rapid growth spells across income groups, we find that 24.55% occurred
in low income countries, about 29% in lower middle income countries, 25.19% in upper
middle income countries and 21.55% in high income countries.
In general, these results suggest that even if we net out the growth effects of recoveries
it remains true that poorer countries can grow rapidly, although whether they do so
relatively more often than their high income counterparts depends on the classification.
That this effect is only weak can be linked to the related convergence debate. Although
neoclassical growth theory predicts that low income countries catch up rapidly with the
rest, absolute convergence is not taking place. The growth profiles presented here support
the view that this absence of catching-up may be driven by the repeated and persistent
occurrence of stagnation spells, rather than the inability of poorer countries to grow
rapidly. They also are consistent with the view that some developing countries can catch
up through accelerated growth, while many other countries fail to do so.
As we discussed, North et al. (2009) suggest that one plausible explanation for the
lack of generalized convergence among economies is that the institutions in lower income
countries deal less well with rapid change and various external and internal shocks.
To recapitulate, open access orders are based on a system of impersonal rule, high
formalization and open participation. Open participation and no barriers to organization
together ensure that open access institutions adapt easily to changing circumstances and
challenges. In contrast, limited access orders which characterize most of the developing
world today are governed by ruling coalitions that rely on personal/informal networks
and explicit rent-sharing agreements to contain conflict and ensure stability. As a result,
their institutions are less adaptive, less able to adjust to shocks and these countries are
more prone to economic crises and stagnation.
Table 2 links the conjecture of North et al. (2009) and similar theories to the approach
developed in this paper by cross-tabulating the different growth episodes with two
indices of institutional quality. The data on institutions is derived from a paper by
de Crombrugghe and Farla (2011), who aggregate a large number of indicators from the
Institutional Profiles Database (IPD) 2009 using principal component analysis. They
8We chose 1960 as it allows us to classify 101 countries. In 1950, we can only classify 51 countries.
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derive two principal components from the data and interpret their meaning. The first
principal component describes the institutional formalization of regulations, while the
second principal component measures the degree of control and intervention by the state.9
Similarly to the income classification used before, we group the scores on each component
into quartiles ranked from low to high. The upper panel in Table 2 shows the results for
the first component and the lower panel the results for the second.
[Table 2 about here]
There is a moderate negative correlation between the index measuring the institutional
formalization of regulations and the incidence of stagnation episodes (ρ ≈ −0.5 in 2007).
The countries belonging to the highest quartile on this index are in stagnation less than
25% of the sample period, while those ranked in the lowest quartile stagnate almost 70%
of the time. In many ways these results resemble those using income groups in 2007.
For example, fast expansions occur relatively most often in the upper middle quartile
and crises occur gradually less often at higher quartiles of the index. In line with the
theory, this suggests that higher institutional formalization of regulations leads to less
stagnation spells and increasingly steady growth. However, the resemblance between the
tabulations using income quartiles in 2007 and the tabulations with the formalization
index is to a large extent owed to the strong correlation (ρ ≈ 0.8) between the log of
GDP per capita in 2007 and the first principal component from the IPD data. In other
words, while Table 2 suggests a strong role for formal institutions in shaping growth
profiles, it does not reveal if this effect can be attributed solely to formal institutions.
Apart from addressing causality issues, we would prefer to classify countries by beginning
of period institutions, but are constrained by the available data.
The bottom panel of Table 2 gives a more differentiated picture. The second principal
component is negatively correlated with stagnation spells. This index can be interpreted
to represent the degree of the state’s involvement in the private economy but also its
degree of authoritarianism. The lowest incidence of stagnation spells (31.83%) occurs
within the group of countries scoring in the lower middle quartile of the index, whereas
countries in the highest quartile stagnated during nearly 70% of the sample period. As
de Crombrugghe and Farla (2011, p. 17) point out “Western European countries, the
USA, Canada, and Australia are at neither extreme of the [index]”, which suggests that
very low scores represent weak states and very high scores represent mostly authoritarian
regimes. This explains why the most stable growth profile is located in the lower middle
quartile of the index and not at either end of the spectrum.
In sum, this brief overview of different growth episodes from 1951 to 2007 highlights
two points. First, the incidence of stagnation spells is much higher in lower and middle
income countries than in high income countries. Second, institutions and especially the
degree of formalization of rules and regulations could be a key driver behind less steady
growth and more crises/stagnation spells, but this effect requires further analysis.
4 Variables and data
In this section we briefly outline the construction of the panel dataset used in the
ensuing analysis. The dependent variable is a binary indicator that is unity if country
9For more details on the construction of the indices see the original paper by de Crombrugghe and
Farla (2011). The Institutional Profiles Database 2009 and earlier waves of the expert survey are publicity
accessible at www.afd.fr/home/recherche/bases-ipd.
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i is experiencing a stagnation episode in year t and zero otherwise, where stagnation
spells are defined according to Section 3.1. The GDP per capita data is from the Penn
World Tables 6.3 (Heston et al., 2009), which holds data for 189 countries and territories
from 1950 to 2007.10 We identify a total of 578 stagnation episodes, or a total of 3,276
country-years of stagnation. The independent variables we include broadly belong to two
categories: macroeconomic indicators and variables describing political institutions as
well as external/internal shocks to these institutions. We elaborate on these below, but
Table A.1 in the Appendix also provides an overview of all independent variables.
Macroeconomic variables: We include a range of proxies for factors that are typically
associated with sound macroeconomic management. Most of these variables have
been found to significantly affect growth performance in traditional panel studies using
annual, 5-year or 10-year growth rates. Hence, it is interesting to investigate to what
extent our approach can confirm such results and how these variables fare compared to
political/institutional factors in predicting the incidence of stagnation spells. Further,
our research design allows us to test if these variables have a differential impact on onset
versus the continuation of stagnation episodes.
In order to control for the level of development, we include the log of GDP per capita
(Log GDP/c(t−1)) in nearly all models. Its expected effect is negative, as richer countries
tend to experience shorter and relatively fewer stagnation spells. Controlling for GDP
also serves a practical purpose. As indicated in the previous section, indices measuring the
quality of institutions and GDP are strongly correlated, so that including both prevents
us from erroneously attributing effects of the one to the other.
Maintaining price stability is widely seen as the core task of central banks and
emphasized by a variety of literatures. For example, a recent paper investigating
positive growth spells by Berg et al. (2011) finds that high inflation reduces the length
of fast growth spells. We expect high inflation to be positively correlated with the
onset of stagnation spells. However, within a stagnation spell the role of inflation is
harder to pinpoint as – together with the exchange rate – it is instrumental in bringing
about internal devaluation and regaining international competitiveness. Our measure of
inflation is 100 times the log of 1 plus the annual inflation rate. This measure is close to
the actual inflation rate when that rate is small but also reduces the influence of larger
values (e.g. rare periods of hyperinflation). The annual inflation data is from the IMF’s
International Financial Statistics (IFS) appended with data from the World Development
Indicators (WDI) whenever the former is missing.
In addition to domestic prices, we also measure if the exchange rate is overvalued
or undervalued in real terms. While traditional growth models do not attribute a
significant role to the real exchange rate, recent research finds that depreciations are
beneficial for growth accelerations (Hausmann et al., 2005) and stimulate growth in
general (Rodrik, 2008). This positive effect may operate through many channels, but
is most commonly linked to export-led growth and the relative price of manufactured
products. On the negative side, radical changes in the real exchange rate can also be
evidence of excessive volatility and potential preludes to currency crises. If the former
10We do not use the entire PWT data for the analysis, but make two adjustments. First, we drop
all countries with less than one million inhabitants (at the last recorded year) and, second, we also drop
countries with fewer than 20 data points in the GDP per capita series – leaving 127 countries. These
modifications mainly serve to weaken the influence of small (island) states on our estimates and maximize
the group size in the resulting panel structure.
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effects are sufficiently strong, exchange rate undervaluation could therefore weaken the
likelihood of experiencing stagnation spells. To capture this effect, we follow Rodrik
(2008) in constructing an index of exchange rate undervaluation (RER V alue(t−1)).11
The index is centered at 0, with higher values indicating exchange rate undervaluation
and lower values indicating overvaluation.
We include two measures of trade performance to, on the one hand, control for any
overlap between the real exchange rate and export performance and, on the other hand,
estimate the effects of trade on stagnation episodes directly. First, we measure the price of
exports relative to imports, the terms of trade (∆ ToT(t−1)), as the annual log difference in
the net barter terms of trade from the WDI and supplement this series with data from the
IFS when there are gaps in the WDI series. Terms of trade growth, declines and shocks
have been linked to growth collapses (Rodrik, 1999; Hausmann et al., 2008), accelerations
(Hausmann et al., 2005) and the premature end of fast growth spells (Berg et al., 2011).
Second, we also estimate the effects of changes in the value of real merchandise exports
(∆ Real Exports(t−1)), which we measure as the annual log difference in the exports
volume index from the WDI, appended with data from the IFS to extend coverage.
Growth in real exports has been suggested to significantly reduce the probability of the
onset of a stagnation spell (Hausmann et al., 2008). We examine if this is also the case
in the presence of dynamics.
Further, the growth literature has identified de jure financial and trade openness
as two key policy variables that positively influence growth outcomes. To account for
the former, we include the Chinn-Ito index (Chinn and Ito, 2006) of financial openness
(Fin. Openness(t−1)). This index is the first principal component of the inverse of
four variables measuring restrictions on external accounts based on the IMFs Annual
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). To account
for the latter, we use a dummy measure for economic liberalization (Trade Openness(t−1))
developed by Sachs and Warner (1995) and extended by Wacziarg and Welch (2008). This
indicator is coded as one in years a given country is completely open to trade and zero
otherwise. While the index’s authors have linked their respective measures to average
growth rates, the growth episodes literature has found financial openness to precede
growth accelerations (Hausmann et al., 2005) and trade liberalization to reduce the risk
that a fast growth spell ends (Berg et al., 2011). Financial liberalization can lead to
both increasing capital inflows and financial deepening but also enable capital flight and
generally volatile capital flows. Hence, its expected sign and size is not clear ex ante. On
the contrary, we expect trade openness to sizably reduce the probability of experiencing
stagnation spells.
Last, we include a measure for income inequality after taxes and transfers
(Inequality(t−1)). Net income inequality is not only an economic variable but just as much
influenced by a country’s political institutions. Most of the growth episodes literature
does not systematically analyze the role of inequality, with the exception of an early study
by Rodrik (1999) and recent evidence of a negative effect on the length of positive growth
spells (Berg et al., 2011; Berg and Ostry, 2011). In panel studies of average growth
rates the effect of inequality remains disputed.12 However, parts of neo-institutional
theory (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997) and earlier work on the interaction of inequality
11This index is based on the PWT 6.3 and its construction is described in more detail in Table A.1.
12Most of this debate took place in the late 1990s and early 2000s, for examples of key studies see
Perotti (1996), Deininger and Squire (1998), Barro (2000), and Forbes (2000). See also Roodman (2009)
on the instability of the GMM estimates in Forbes (2000).
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and growth collapses (Rodrik, 1999) suggest a negative sign for inequality, while early
growth theory suggests that inequality rises alongside rapid development and falls again
at higher income levels (Kuznets, 1955). Our data for net income inequality is taken
from Solt (2009), who appends, benchmarks, and standardizes the UNU-WIDER World
Income Inequality Database (WIID) to improve cross-country comparability.
Institutional and ‘shock’ variables: This set of variables aims to capture both parts
of the observable cross-country heterogeneity that can be attributed to institutions, as
well as various shocks which require a response by the political/institutional structure.
These shocks may be external or internal but have in common that they pose a challenge
to the prevailing regime and/or a country’s institutional set up.
Cross-sectional studies of GDP levels find strong support that institutions explain
large parts of long-run growth (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu
et al., 2001, 2002) and also provide evidence that growth-enhancing institutions (e.g.
property rights or executive constraints) contribute to lower growth volatility (Acemoglu
et al., 2003). In line with these findings and the theory of North et al. (2009), we
expect that more open and democratically constrained13 institutions will reduce the
probability of experiencing a stagnation spell. Our most straightforward measure of
political institutions is the revised combined polity score (Polity2(t−1)) from the Polity
IV project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010) This measure is the difference between a
country’s score on the aggregate institutionalized democracy index and the score on the
institutionalized autocracy index coded by the Polity IV project. It has a range from
−10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). We rely on the Polity IV
data, as the Institutional Profiles Database which we used in the preceding section and
most other popular measures (e.g. WGI) have a very limited time dimension. For studies
requiring time-series, the Polity IV data is unique as it provides indicators for every year,
in many cases going back to 1800.
From Polity IV, we also derive two additional measures of political shocks that have
previously been used in the literature on growth accelerations (e.g. Hausmann et al.,
2005). Based on the variable REGTRANS, we code a dummy for positive regime changes
(Regchange +(t−1)) as major positive changes of the political structure identified by at
least a three-point improvement in the polity score. Conversely, we code negative regime
changes (Regchange −(t−1)) as a minimum three-point negative change in the polity
score, including interregna and state failure.14 Intuitively, we expect negative regime
changes to increase the probability of stagnation, while positive regime changes may
have a stagnation deterring or a negligible effect.
We also include a dummy for the irregular exit of leaders (Leader Exit(t−1)) based
on Archigos 2.9 (Goemans et al., 2009) as a proxy for internal shocks to a country’s
political regime. This variable codes an irregular exit whenever a country’s major leader
(president, chancellor, dictator and so forth) lost power by means violating established
13Polity IV scores countries on five indices capturing the openness of the political process and
the constraints placed on individual actors. We interpret the data as measuring the degree of open
institutions with narrow mandates. The components are ‘Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment’,
‘Openness of Executive Recruitment’, ‘Constraints on Chief Executive’, ‘Regulation of participation’,
and ‘Competitiveness of Participation’.
14In the case of growth accelerations, Hausmann et al. (2005) originally found that these are preceded
by negative and positive regime changes. Jong-A-Pin and De Haan (2008) point out that this conclusion
was based on an error in coding the regime change variables to also include minor changes in the polity
score. Following their correction, we do not code any type of regime change if REGTRANS=0.
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rules and conventions. Such cases include, but are not limited to, the loss of power due
to the removal by a foreign power, assassinations, ill health and domestic popular protest
with foreign support. We focus on leader exit and not entry, as our aim is to link periods
of stagnation to unexpected adverse events and not to their possible resolution. Some
studies of growth accelerations have accounted for the sudden death of leaders in office
(Hausmann et al., 2005; Jones and Olken, 2008) but usually not other types of exit.
In order to investigate the impact of large scale violence on stagnation spells, we
include a dummy for the occurrence of War/Conflict(t−1) based on the UCDP/PRIO
Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2011 (Gleditsch et al., 2002). We expect countries that are
the location of an interstate war or large civil strife to be especially prone of falling into
a stagnation spell. Our measure codes a country as a location of war if the UCDP/PRIO
database records an intensity level of 2 or higher, corresponding to at least 1,000 battle-
related deaths in a country-year, and if the country is recorded as a location of war. In
the case of multiple conflicts, our measure relies on the conflict with the highest intensity.
5 Models and estimation techniques
Most extant studies of growth episodes use pooled probit or non-linear panel methods to
study the onset of a certain type of growth episode, such as positive growth spells (e.g.
accelerations or trend breaks) or negative growth spells (e.g. collapses or stagnation).15
For this purpose, these studies usually drop all but the first observation when countries
are experiencing the episode of interest and estimate differences to all those periods
when they do not. Only two recent papers concerned with the duration of growth
collapses (Hausmann et al., 2008) or length of positive growth spells (Berg et al.,
2011) use observations within the growth episode to estimate survival models. Apart
from Jerzmanowski’s (2006) Markov-switching models, most studies do not model the
occurrence of a growth spell as a dynamic process. However, genuine state-dependence
may be a crucial feature of any episode in general and of stagnation spells in particular.
Dropping observations and disregarding information that can otherwise be used for
inference is inefficient, especially if better estimation techniques can be applied utilizing
the whole data. Moreover, in the case of growth episodes that already occur with low
frequencies, doing so radically reduces the number of observations and introduces rare
event bias (King and Zeng, 2001). In growth research, this practice was partially inspired
by the political science literature on the onset of civil war. For example, Fearon and
Laitin (2003) or Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004) argued that some factors may be associated
differently with the onset of civil conflict in contrast to its continuation. Very recently,
this assumption was challenged by Bleaney and Dimico (2011), who point out that
theories of conflict rarely – if ever – indicate that some factors should have a different
impact on the first occurrence of civil war than the entire war. Instead, they present a
simple statistical framework to test this hypothesis and let the data decide which factors
matter for onset and continuation, respectively. Many of their points carry over into
the growth episodes literature without much need for qualification. Macroeconomics and
neo-institutional economics provide little guidance as to why some factors should only
15Most studies drop within-spell observations and use probit or logit models to investigate the onset
of various episodes (see Hausmann et al., 2005; Pattillo et al., 2005; Hausmann et al., 2008; Imam and
Salinas, 2008; Eichengreen et al., 2011; Jong-A-Pin and De Haan, 2011), while others avoid this problem
by mainly examining mean-shifts across an episode or onset of an episode (Arbache and Page, 2007;
Jones and Olken, 2008).
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relate to the beginning of, for example, stagnation spells rather than the entire spell.
However, Bleaney and Dimico (2011) fail to recognize that when specifying dynamic
non-linear models, special attention is required to address well-known econometric issues
arising in such models, such as spurious state-dependence, endogeneity of the lagged state
together with unobserved heterogeneity, the so-called initial conditions problem and the
non-linearity of interaction effects.
Building on these criticisms, the remainder of this section outlines our empirical model,
describes the research strategy in general, and discusses several linear and non-linear
estimation techniques addressing the aforementioned complications. We then apply these
techniques to our data in the next section.
5.1 Dynamic models
Our most basic dynamic model is:
yit = 1[x
′
itβ + ρyi,t−1 + εit > 0], i = 1, ..., n, t = 2, ..., Ti (1)
where yit is the binary outcome variable indicating whether or not a country i is in
a stagnation spell in year t, x′it is the transpose of a vector of covariates, yi,t−1 is an
indicator if country i is in a stagnation spell in period t − 1, and εit is a country and
time-specific error term that may include unobserved effects.
For ease of exposition, we write the general model as a single index model, leaving
the functional form unspecified for now. This model can be interpreted as a first-order
autoregressive process with covariates. Using the entire available sample constrains the
parameters in β to be equal for stagnation spells as a whole. In order to allow the impact
of the covariates to be different in a stagnation spell than during expansions and to
include possible unobserved heterogeneity, we extend this model with interaction terms
and expand the error:
yit = 1[x
′
itβ + ρyi,t−1 + x
′
ityi,t−1γ + µi + νit > 0], i = 1, ..., n, t = 2, ..., Ti (2)
where, in the linear case, the elements of the parameter vector γ can be interpreted
as slope shifts in the effects of the variables in xit if a country is in a stagnation spell (i.e.
yi,t−1 = 1), while mean shifts are captured by ρ. The error term (εit) is now expanded into
a time-invariant unobserved country-effect (µi) and a residual time-varying error (νit).
For now, the unobserved effects may be fixed or random and no assumptions towards their
distribution or correlation with the included variables are imposed. In most specifications,
we also include 5-year time dummies in the vector xit but not its interaction with yi,t−1.
This model allows us to test the hypothesis that a specific variable has a different
effect within a stagnation spell than over the entire episode. For any given parameter γk
that is an element of γ, we simply test the null hypothesis that γk = 0. Similarly, we can
also test the joint hypotheses that any subset of the vector γ or the entire vector is equal
to zero. In the latter case, equation (2) reduces to (1).
As theory provides little guidance, our modeling strategy is to “let the data decide”
which variables in xit require an interaction term with yi,t−1 and which do not. We
proceed in four steps. First, we specify a fully interacted model according to equation
(2). Second, we test if those interaction terms that are individually insignificant at the
10% level are also jointly equal to zero. Third, based on the linear models, we specify
a ‘parsimonious’ reference model that retains only those elements in γ that pass our
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exclusion criteria and, fourth, we verify its results with non-linear techniques.
Estimating the model specified in (2) using linear or non-linear estimation methods
usually requires more restrictive assumptions towards the underlying data-generating
process, including the exogeneity of the included regressors and the structure of the
unobserved heterogeneity. However, neglecting to account for these often results in biased
estimators.16 The bias mainly arises from two sources. First, the lagged state (yi,t−1) is
fully endogenous and thus violates the usual assumptions made in simple static linear
or non-linear models. Second, the unobserved effects are potentially correlated with
the lagged state, leading to the issue of spurious versus true state-dependence and the
related initial conditions problem. In the following, we discuss several linear and non-
linear probability models that can account for some or all of these issues in more detail.
5.2 Linear probability models
The simplest and possibly most intuitive way to approach our problem is to specify a linear
probability model (LPM) with country-fixed effects (FE). This approach is particularly
attractive, as FE OLS requires no distributional assumptions about the unobserved effects
and the OLS coefficients are usually a good approximation of marginal effects near the
means of the variables. However, even in static models, the key problem with the LPM
is that it does not take the bounded nature of the dependent variable into account. In
other words, the LPM can predict probabilities outside the unit interval [0, 1].
Further, the LPM is always subject to heteroscedasticity because the dependent
variable is bernoulli distributed.17 The OLS estimate can be made robust to
heteroscedasticity by using a sandwich estimator of the covariance matrix, but
FGLS (feasible generalized-least squares) is better suited to account for the inherent
heteroscedasticity and delivers more efficient estimates. FGLS is a two-step estimator,
which weighs the observations by the inverse of an estimate of the standard deviation of
the residuals derived from the LPM. However, only non-zero and non-negative weights
are feasible, which implies that the predicted probabilities must be strictly within the
unit interval (0 < P(Yˆit = 1) < 1), otherwise they require trimming to a value near the
interval bounds.
In our specific application the LPM has two further shortcomings. First, we allow
for unobserved effects (µi), but the LPM somewhat awkwardly constrains these effects to
respect x′itβ < µi < 1−x′itβ.18 Second and more importantly, the inclusion of the lagged
state means that the fixed-effects OLS estimate of ρ is downward biased (Nickell, 1981).
While the second problem applies to samples with finite T , it is more severe in panels
with a small time dimension and is decreasing in T . Our estimation sample usually has
an average time dimension of approximately 18 years, therefore we do not expect this bias
to be very large. To verify that our models are robust to this bias and compare the linear
models to its non-linear counterparts with more restrictive distributional assumptions,
we also estimate a dynamic linear probability (DLP) model using Generalized Methods
16As a case in point, Bleaney and Dimico (2011) specify a dynamic probit model but do not address
endogeneity and unobserved effects, which is very likely to render their statistical tests unreliable.
17This implies that the expected variance of the binary outcome given xit will not be zero but x
′
itβ(1−
x′itβ), which can be shown easily. The variance of a bernoulli distributed variable is p(1 − p), in our
case p = E[Yit|xit] = x′itβ, so V ar[Yit|xit] = x′itβ(1− x′itβ), since V ar[ε|xit] = V ar[y|xit] this indicates
heteroscedasticity because the variance depends on xit.
18For an explanation of this issue in particular and a modern textbook treatment of the properties of
the LPM in general see Wooldridge (2010).
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of Moments (GMM) estimators. GMM techniques for dynamic panel models with small
or fixed T and large N are designed to specifically deal with the endogeneity of the lagged
state in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity and are being increasingly applied to
dynamic linear probability models (e.g. Alessie et al., 2004).
Analogous to (2), the least-squares fixed-effects model we estimate is:
yit = x
′
itβ + ρyi,t−1 + x
′
ityi,t−1γ + µi + νit, i = 1, ..., n, t = 2, ..., Ti (3)
First-differencing this equation removes the time-invariant unobserved effects (µi):
∆yit = ∆x
′
itβ + ρ∆yi,t−1 + ∆x
′
it∆yi,t−1γ + ∆νit (4)
However, the presence of the lagged state in (3) implies that the differences lagged state
∆yi,t−1 is still potentially correlated with ∆νit. To see this, suppose that country i
experienced a large idiosyncratic shock in t − 1 that causes yi,t−1 = 1, then the second
term in ∆νit = νit−νi,t−1 and the first term in ∆yi,t−1 = yi,t−1−yi,t−2 are also correlated.
To account for the endogeneity of ∆yi,t−1, Anderson and Hsiao (1982, AH) propose
to use the second lags of yit from the level equation (3) as instruments. This difference
and levels estimator provides a consistent estimate of ρ. Similarly, we can use the same
technique to instrument the interaction terms ∆x′it∆yi,t−1 with the second lag in levels
to get consistent estimates of γ.
Difference GMM generalizes the approach of AH to include all lags of order 2 and
higher as instruments for the endogenous regressors (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988; Arellano
and Bond, 1991). The difference GMM estimator is based on the following moment
conditions: E[yi,t−s∆νit] = 0 and E[xi,t−s∆νit] = 0 for all t ≥ 2 and s ≥ 2. Further, it
requires that the error terms are not serially correlated over time. The results obtained
with this estimator are more efficient than the instrumental variables estimator of AH,
as it uses all of the possible orthogonality conditions available in the sample. In practice,
however, the relevance of longer lags as instruments for differences decreases quickly and
leads to the ‘weak instruments problem’ (Roodman, 2009).
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) extend the GMM approach
further and argue that past levels may not always be good instruments for future
differences leading to potentially biased and inefficient estimates, especially for random-
walk like variables. Instead, they propose a system GMM estimator that instruments
levels with lagged differences and estimates both equations simultaneously. This
estimator is consistent and often provides more efficient estimates than difference GMM.
The additional moment conditions exploited by this approach are: E[∆yi,t−s(µi+νit)] = 0
and E[∆xi,t−s(µi+νit)] = 0 for all t ≥ 3 and s ≥ 2. In other words, the lagged differences
should not be correlated with the unobserved effects. System GMM also requires the
initial conditions (yi0) to be in a stationary equilibrium, which is arguably an unnatural
assumption to make in the analysis of stagnation episodes.
As shown by Roodman (2009), both difference and system GMM results are often
unstable and strongly depend on the instrument matrix used. For this reason, we do
not use it for model building but only apply system GMM to the previously derived
‘parsimonious’ specification to confirm whether the results remain within a reasonable
range of the LPM estimates.
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5.3 Non-linear probability models
So far, all the discussed techniques apply linear approximations to an inherently non-
linear problem. Symmetric bounded functions, such as the logistic cumulative density
or the cumulative normal distribution solve this basic problem of functional form
misspecification and are commonly estimated using logit or probit models, respectively.
However, modeling unobserved heterogeneity in non-linear binary choice models is more
complicated than in the linear case, as within transformations or first differences do
not eliminate the unobserved heterogeneity. Since the unobserved effects and the
endogenous lagged state in dynamic probability models are correlated and non-removable
by transformation, GMM-type instrumentation strategies are also not available.
In non-linear binary choice models, the assumptions made on the structure of the
unobserved effects in practice also decides which type of model can be estimated. We
apply two techniques: fixed-effects logit and dynamic random-effects probit. On the
one hand, the fixed-effects logit estimator is less restrictive in its assumptions about the
unobserved heterogeneity but similarly to the LPM with FE, it does not deal with the
endogeneity of the lagged state. On the other hand, the correlated random-effects probit
estimator requires explicit assumptions about the unobserved heterogeneity, but has been
modified to account for the endogeneity of the lagged state, including solutions for the
initial conditions problem (Heckman, 1981; Orme, 2001; Wooldridge, 2005).
Fixed-effects logit: The standard dummy variables fixed-effects logit model estimated
by unconditional Maximum Likelihood (ML) runs into a statistical problem. Consider an
adaptation of the simple model in equation (1), without the lagged state but including
the unobserved effects:
P (yit = 1|xit) = F (x′itβ + µi + νit), i = 1, ..., n, t = 1, ..., Ti (5)
where F (·) is the cumulative logistic distribution (F (z) = ez/(1 + ez)).
To estimate this equation, we need a consistent estimate over t = 1, ..., Ti for each of the
unobserved effects µi because in ML estimation the log-likelihood function is maximized
over the time-series of each group and then over groups. However, Ti is often small and
as a result any inconsistency introduced there will create inconsistency in the estimate
of β as it is a function of the estimated constants. This is the well-known incidental
parameters problem which, for balanced panels, creates a bias in β in the order of 1/T
(Greene, 2011). Similarly to the bias of the lagged state in the LPM, this bias is decreasing
in T and hence, we do not expect it to be very large. Greene (2011, p. 621), for example,
illustrates in Monte Carlo simulations using a sample of N = 1000 with 200 replications
that the bias of β is only about 6.9% when T = 20, but as large as 100% if T = 2.
For the logit model, Chamberlain (1980) observed that there is a computational
trick that allows consistent estimation of the parameter vector but not the constants by
conditioning on the sum of observed outcomes within groups (
∑Ti
t=1 yit). This conditional
logit estimator result in a log-likelihood function where the incidental parameters µi drop
out and which can be estimated using standard ML techniques. However, conditioning
on the observed outcomes comes at a cost. Since groups in which yit does not change
over Ti provide no information for the likelihood (log of 1 is 0), they too drop out of the
log-likelihood. In practice, if there’s strong persistence such that y¯i ≈ 1 or y¯i ≈ 0, the
number of observations used in the estimation may reduce by a lot – thus also changing
the estimates. Likewise, time-invariant effects can no longer be included, as they would
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also cancel out of the estimation equation. Further, since the µi are not identified but
“conditioned out” and the partial effects depend on the expected value of the unobserved
effects, the partial effects cannot be estimated either.
Given the expectation that the unconditional ML estimator is not too strongly biased
and allows estimation of partial effects, we estimate both models and compare their
results. For both the conditional and unconditional logit models, we specify the logit
model implied by equation (2) with FE dummies in the case of unconditional logit and
without in the case of conditional logit. However, neither of these two estimators nor
other common logit approaches are able to account for the endogeneity of the lagged
state – for this, we turn to random effects probit.
Random effects probit: While in the logit specification the unobserved effects can
be removed by conditioning on the sum of the observed outcomes, this is not the case
for the equivalent probit model. Even more restrictively, the standard random effects
probit model assumes that the unobserved heterogeneity is not correlated with included
regressors (strict exogeneity). Considering the probit variant of equation (1), then the
presence of the lagged state (yi,t−1) together with µi violates this assumption even if ρ is
zero and invalidates the last equality (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 626):
P (yit = 1|yi,t−1, ..., yi0,xit, µi) = Φ(x′itβ + ρyi,t−1 + µi + νit) 6= P (yit = 1|xit) (6)
where Φ(·) is the cumulative normal distribution and yi0 are the initial conditions.
This is the problem of true versus spurious state-dependence. The estimated effect of
yi,t−1 may depend on three sources: (1) serial correlation in the errors, (2) correlation with
the unobserved effect and (3) true state-dependence (Greene, 2011, p. 729). In such a
setting, the normal fixed or random effects estimation techniques do not provide consistent
estimates of the parameter. Further, the outcome path may be severely influenced by
the initial conditions (yi0), which enter the unconditional likelihood function and prohibit
integrating out the unobserved effects (µi). In short, to estimate dynamic random effects
probit we are faced with two related problems, the assumption of strict exogeneity and
the problem posed by a log-likelihood that includes the initial conditions.
A relaxation of the strict exogeneity assumption has been developed for static models
by Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1984), whose modification is known as correlated
random effects probit. According to the Mundlak-Chamberlain approach, we can allow
for correlation between xit and µi by restricting the distribution of unobserved effects to
be related with means of the explanatory variables as follows:
µi = η0 + x¯
′
iη2 + ui (7)
where the ui are assumed to be i.i.d. and normally distributed. The vector x¯i consists
of time-averages of the regressors xit. Further, this model implies that the composite
error terms (ui + νit) are equicorrelated over any two different time periods: Corr(ui +
νit, ui + νis) = σ
2
u/(σ
2
u + σ
2
ν) for any t 6= s, where σ2ν is normalized to 1.
While this approach allows for correlated random effects, it does not address the
issue of dynamics and the related initial conditions problem. Four solutions have been
proposed to deal with this issue. One possibility is to assume that the initial conditions
are completely exogenous and proceed with conditional maximum likelihood. However,
this assumption is highly implausible as it requires that the unobserved effects (country
effects) are independent of the initial state (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 626). A better but
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complicated approach is to allow the initial conditions to be randomly distributed and
approximate their distribution (Heckman, 1981). The third method is a related two-
step bias correction procedure that also models the initial state (Orme, 2001). The last
and latest proposal is to condition on the time-average covariates and the initial values
in estimating the density (yi1, ..., yiTi) by specifying a distribution of the unobserved
effects given the initial conditions (Wooldridge, 2005). While the latter approach does
not specify a distribution of the initial conditions, it is especially attractive because it
can be estimated using standard random effects software. Arulampalam and Stewart
(2009) investigate the properties of these different estimators find that their performance
is very similar for panels with a moderate time dimension and no estimator consistently
outperforms the others in all simulations. For this reason, we apply the computationally
undemanding Wooldridge estimator.
Concretely, Wooldridge (2005) proposes to specify the conditional distribution of the
unobserved effects as µi|yi0, x¯i ∼ N (η0 + η1yi0 + x¯′iη2, σ2η), where x¯i are the time-averages
as in Mundlak-Chamberlain. This results from the following parametric specification for
the unobserved effects, where the ui are normally distributed and independent of (yi0, x¯i):
µi = η0 + η1yi0 + x¯
′
iη2 + ui (8)
Substitution of (8) into the basic index model in equation (1) gives:
yit = 1[x
′
itβ + ρyi,t−1 + η0 + η1yi0 + x¯
′
iη2 + ui + νit > 0], i = 1, ..., n, t = 2, ..., Ti (9)
Wooldridge (2005) also points out that this model model can be extended by including
interactions with the lagged-state and the corresponding interactions with the initial
conditions. Given that we are precisely interested in testing these interactions, this is
ideal. Hence, as a final model, we fit the Wooldridge version of equation (2):
(10)Pr(yit|yi,t−1,xit, yi0, x¯i, µi) =
Φ(x′itβ + ρyi,t−1 + x
′
ityi,t−1γ + η0 + η1yi0 + x
′
ityi0θ + x¯
′
iη2 + ui)
where xit is the vector of explanatory variables, yi,t−1 is the lagged state, the vector
γ allows for differential effects of the covariates within the state (xityi,t−1), η1 measures
the effect of the initial condition (yi0), the vector θ measures the effect of the covariates
depending on the initial condition (x′ityi0), x¯i are the time-means across units of the
covariates. Estimation still proceeds over i = 1, ..., n and t = 2, ..., Ti.
Using the law of iterated expectations, Wooldridge (2005) also shows that the average
partial effects (APEs), which are not identified in the conditional logit model, are in fact
identified when this method is applied.19 In other words, the dynamic random effects
probit model addresses all three fundamental issues involved in our research problem.
It correctly specifies the functional form of the dependent variable, relaxes the strict
exogeneity assumption, and consistently estimates the APE of time-varying variables
and the lagged-state in the presence of unobserved effects. Hence, we consider it the
most appropriate for our data.
19In Appendix B, we further discuss the issue of partial effects of interaction terms in non-linear
models, derive their standard errors using the Delta method, and summarize the argument from
Wooldridge (2005) showing that the APEs of time-varying variables are indeed identified this model.
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6 Estimation results
6.1 Linear models
Before presenting the results from the linear regressions, we first elaborate how we build
the FGLS model in practice and highlight an interesting finding regarding the distribution
of the predicted probabilities of stagnation. As discussed in the preceding section, the
FGLS estimator requires an estimate of the conditional variance to account for the
inherent heteroscedasticity. This variance estimate is typically based on the predictions of
the linear probability model20 and can easily be adjusted for clustering at the country level
by averaging either the variance estimates or the predicted probabilities across countries.
Figure 2 graphs the distribution of the (untrimmed) predicted probabilities using both
approaches and illustrates why the latter approach is particularly attractive in our case.
As expected, the LPM predicts probabilities outside of the unit interval (left panel),
but when we average the probabilities across countries first, the estimates remain almost
perfectly within the open unit interval (right panel). Hence, the second approach gets
rid of many predictions that are otherwise problematic.21
[Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 also reveals the surprising result that the predicted probabilities are clearly
bimodal, with the modes being located near the bounds of the unit interval.22 In other
words, the LPM predicts some countries to almost always experience a stagnation spell
and others almost never. While this is a qualitatively interesting result, it also indicates
that non-linear models will provide better estimates of the partial effects than the linear
approximation, which works best with unimodal probability distributions.
In Table 3 we report the results from variations of the linear probability model under
different estimation assumptions. We compute the LPM using OLS with country fixed-
effects and 5-year dummies in two ways. The first model is the fixed-effects model with
standard errors clustered at the country level. The second model is similar, but we now
allow for clustering over years instead countries, thus making the standard errors robust
to common shocks in given year. Model three shows the FGLS estimator with clustering
at the country-level. Model four is the parsimonious FGLS specification discarding those
interaction terms that are individually and jointly insignificant. Model five and six re-
estimate model four using the system GMM approach with different instruments sets.
[Table 3 about here]
The bottom panel of Table 3 reports four rows (labeled “joint:”) containing the p-
values of joint hypothesis tests. The first row tests the hypothesis that the country
fixed-effects are zero, which is firmly rejected in all specifications that estimate country-
effects. The second row tests the joint significance of the 5-year time dummies. Only
20Computed as vr = yˆ(1− yˆ), where yˆ is the vector of predictions.
21There are still many predictions (440) near the interval bounds, so we trim the mean probabilities
according to yˆi = .05 if yˆ∗i ≤ .5 or yˆi = .95 if yˆ∗i ≥ .95, where yˆ∗i refers to group-means of the untrimmed
probabilities. This moves the estimates closer to the OLS results and ensures that these observations do
not disproportionately influence the estimates. This process is somewhat arbitrary but justifiable. We
trim the values to a conservative 5 percentage points distance from the interval bounds to lessen the
influence of observations close to these bounds. For example, the weight of an observation trimmed to
0.05 is 1/
√
0.05 ≈ 4.47, whereas trimming to 0.01 would imply 1/√0.01 = 10.
22This is confirmed by the non-linear models which allow estimating a comparable distribution.
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in the first model the 5-year dummies border on significance at the 10% level. In all
other cases, we cannot reject the null that the time-effects are jointly zero. Rows three
and four of the joint-tests are key to our model-building approach. Row three tests if
the coefficients of the interactions with the lagged state (γ-vector) and the coefficient of
the lagged state (ρ) are jointly zero; taken together these variables comprise Set I. In all
models this hypothesis is rejected, indicating the presence of dynamics. In the row below,
we test if the coefficients of those interactions with the lagged state that are individually
insignificant at the 10% level in the current model (i.e. Set II) are also jointly equal to
zero. In all specifications, the insignificant variables fail this joint-exclusion test.
In general, the fully-interacted models (1)–(3) in Table 3 give very similar results.
For the variables without interactions, we find that inflation, financial openness, trade
openness and negative regime changes significantly affect the probability of a stagnation
spell. Furthermore, each of these variables enters with its expected sign. In model two,
which allows for clustering per year, the standard error of inflation becomes slightly larger
making it marginally insignificant at the 10%-level, while the standard error of the Polity2
index gets smaller and its coefficient becomes significant at the 5%-level. Considering
the interactions with the lagged state, the coefficients of inflation, trade openness and
negative regime changes are robustly different from zero in most models. Interestingly, in
all three cases the interaction effect has the opposite sign to the non-interacted coefficient,
indicating that the effects of these three variables are weaker within a stagnation spell.
Model (1) also suggests that the dummies for irregular exits of leaders and wars/conflicts
should have interaction terms, but these are not robust in the specification with clustering
per year and the more efficient FGLS estimates.
Model (4) only retains those interactions that pass the exclusion tests, i.e. discarding
all jointly and individually insignificant interactions terms from the previous specification.
This model is our baseline and parsimonious specification which we later re-estimate with
non-linear techniques. We still find evidence that inflation, trade openness and negative
regime changes have a different impact within the spell than on the onset probabilities.
However, the interaction effect of financial openness which is marginally significant in
model three becomes insignificant once we remove the other redundant interactions.
The parsimonious specification in model (4) is also the easiest to interpret in terms of
partial effects and economic significance. A one point increase in the inflation measure in
t−1 leads to a 0.5% higher probability of entering a stagnation spell if the country is not
already stagnating. However, if the country was already in a stagnation spell in t−1, then
a unit increase only translates into a higher continuation probability of 0.02%. Since we
measure inflation as 100 · ln(1 + gCPI), a unit increase on the index roughly corresponds
to a 1 percentage point increase in inflation. Further, the effect of trade openness is very
large, but also becomes considerably smaller once a stagnation episode has started. If
the country is not in a stagnation spell in t − 1, being open to trade as measured by
the Wacziarg-Welch dummy reduces the chance of stagnation the next year by 23.05%.
Yet within a stagnation spell trade openness reduces the probability of continuation by
only 2.2%. Negative regime changes in t − 1 increase the probability of a falling into a
stagnation episode by an astonishing 27.4%, but this effect also vanishes within a spell
where negative regime changes lower the probability of remaining in stagnation by -
0.33%. Last, a one unit increase in the Chinn-Ito index of financial openness reduces the
probability of stagnation by about 3.4% if the country was not stagnating the year before
and by 1.1% within a stagnation spell. However, the coefficient of the interaction term is
insignificant, suggesting that these two effects cannot be statistically distinguished. The
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effects of each of these four variables are insignificant if a country is already in stagnation,
suggesting that they matter for the onset of a stagnation spell but not for its continuation.
The model also indicates that there is considerable state-dependence, even though this
effect is known to be downward-biased in linear fixed-effects models. The average partial
effect of yi,t−1 is about 0.293. In other words, if a country is already in a stagnation spell
in t − 1, the probability of being in stagnation in year t is 29.3% higher compared to a
country that is not in a stagnation spell in t− 1.
Interestingly, in the linear models we do not find any evidence that the log of GDP
per capita, changes in the terms of trade, growth in real exports, real exchange rate
undervaluation, inequality, institutions (Polity2), irregular leader exits, and war/conflicts
in t − 1 have a significant and robust impact on either the onset or continuation of
stagnation episodes. Further, the coefficients of GDP, inequality and wars/conflict do
not have their expected sign, but their estimated effects are small and the confidence
intervals around these point estimates are comparatively wide.
The system GMM specifications in models five and six mainly serve to asses if the
parameter estimates remain similar once we account for the endogeneity of the lagged
state and all interactions with the lagged state. For many variables this is not the case.
Only the coefficient of inflation retains its approximate size and statistical significance,
although the second model suggests a marginal effect that is almost ten times higher.
The coefficient of negative regime changes stills point in the same direction, but its effect
becomes implausibly large. Similarly, most other parameters appear rather unstable,
which may be owed more to the inability of system GMM to identify their effects using
the available internal instruments rather than any substantive reasons.
System GMM results strongly depend on the validity of the estimation assumptions.
For this reason, we report several additional tests for the last two models in Table 3. The
Arellano-Bond tests (AB-Tests) examine the serial correlation structure of the errors for
first-order autocorrelation (AR1) and second-order autocorrelation (AR2). Generally, the
moment conditions are valid only if the AR2 test is rejected, while failure to reject the AR1
test is expected due to the presence of first-order dynamics. Both GMM specifications
pass these tests. A more substantial problem in GMM estimation is overfitting through
the use of too many instruments (Roodman, 2009), which Table 3 reveals to be a primary
concern in our case. We report the instrument count and the p-value of Hansen’s J-
statistic, testing if the instruments are exogenous. The first GMM model uses the second
and third lag of the endogenous variables as instruments in order to limit the total number
of instruments. Nevertheless, this still results in a p-value for the J-statistic of unity. A
perfect p-value can easily arise if the number of instruments is large relative to the group
size and usually indicates that the test has very low power. We address this concern
in the second GMM model by collapsing the instrument set to reduce the number of
instruments to less than the number of countries.23 We can still accept the hypothesis
that the instruments are exogenous, but the parameters change considerably compared
to the previous GMM model and the linear models.
The results suggest that applying GMM in our context is less than ideal. Five
endogenous regressors and a moderate time-dimension quickly lead to instrument
proliferation and therefore problems in identifying an instrument set that balances gains
in efficiency with decreasing relevance of the instruments. As Roodman (2009) shows in
simulations, the weak instruments problem can outweigh the benefits of applying GMM
and lead to unstable or even irrelevant results. Further, system GMM also builds on
23Roodman (2009) explains this technique in detail.
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the assumption that the initial state is in equilibrium, which is untenable in our case.
Accordingly, we place less emphasis on the GMM results and rely more on verifying the
results from the preceding linear models with non-linear techniques.
In sum, this the linear models point towards several preliminary conclusions. First,
in all specifications there is considerable evidence of unobserved heterogeneity at the
country level, but less evidence in favor of time effects. Second, state-dependence plays
a large role in determining whether a country experiences a stagnation episode or not.
Third, we find that only inflation, financial openness, trade openness and negative regime
changes have a statistically significant effect on the probability of stagnation, and fourth,
all significant interaction terms with the lagged state point into the direction opposite of
their non-interacted counterparts.
6.2 Non-linear models
As discussed in Section 5, both the logit and probit estimators explicitly model the
bounded nature of the dependent variable, while Wooldridge’s random effects probit
estimator also provides a solution to the initial conditions problem and consistently
estimates the effect of the lagged state and effects of interactions with the lagged state.
In the following, we present the results from the logit and probit models, respectively.
Interpreting the effects of non-linear models additionally requires the computation
of partial effects at the mean, at a representative value or as an average across the
sample distribution. The derivative of a non-linear function with respect to any variable
also depends on the value of the function at a particular point, which implies that
the regression coefficients are not constant and not equivalent to the partial effects of
these variables. However, in absence of other explicitly modeled non-linearities, the
regression coefficients in probit and logit models usually indicate the sign and approximate
significance of the corresponding partial effect, but are scaled in size. This relationship
breaks down when interaction terms and other non-linear combinations are included. In
fact, the partial effect of an interaction term can be different in sign, size and significance
than the corresponding regression coefficient. Frequently, the partial effects of interactions
even change signs across the distribution of predicted outcomes, leading some authors
to conclude that these are best-examined graphically (e.g. Ai and Norton, 2003; Greene,
2010). For the purposes of this paper, however, we are precisely interested in how much
the partial effect of any interaction with the lagged state differs on average between
the two relevant groups (yi,t−1 = 1 and yi,t−1 = 0) and in comparisons to the linear
approximation. In order to reconcile this aim with the non-linearities of interaction terms,
we compute both the average partial effects (APEs) and estimate the sample distribution
of partial effects.24
[Table 4 about here]
Table 4 presents the results using the fixed-effects logit estimators. We report three
models and the corresponding APEs of the parsimonious model. As a reference, the
first two columns show the fully interacted model estimated using conditional maximum
likelihood, where the fixed-effects are not estimated but drop out. Model two is the
conditional fixed-effects logit equivalent of the parsimonious linear model, and model
three is the same model using dummy variables for the country-fixed effects instead of
24We refer the reader to Appendix B for details on the calculation.
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conditioning on the sum of observed outcomes per group. The last two columns report
the APEs estimated on the basis of the previous fixed-effects specification. The APEs
of interaction terms are reported similarly to coefficients of a linear model; that is, if
yi,t−1 = 0, the APE is reported in the row of the non-interacted variable and, for yi,t−1 = 1,
the total APE is the composite of the former and the APE of the interaction term.
Another complication in interpreting the results of the conditional logit model is that
the APEs are not identified, for the simple reason that the individual country effects are
not estimated. In order to approximate the APEs, we estimate the equivalent dummy
variables fixed-effects logit model and compute the APEs based on its results. Models
two and three using both conditional and unconditional logit show that the parameter
estimates and the corresponding standard errors remain very similar. As expected, we
find that the bias introduced by the incidental parameters problem is not large given the
moderate time-dimension of the panel, which justifies our approach. However, applying
conditional and unconditional logit substantially reduces the estimation sample to 1314
observations in 62 countries, for lack of within-group variation.
In terms of economic significance, many of the results in Table 4 resemble those of the
linear models. We still find evidence that inflation, financial openness, trade liberalization
and negative regime changes significantly affect the probability of stagnation. However,
for all but the latter25, the APEs of the interaction terms are statistically insignificant and
only in the case of inflation and trade openness they still point in the opposite direction.
The APEs are also close to the linear approximation in terms of size. A unit increase
in the inflation measure in t−1 increases the probability of stagnation in t by 0.6% if the
country was not stagnating in t−1, but by 0.5% if the country was in stagnation in t−1.
Similarly, the APEs of trade openness and negative regime changes are still the largest
effects in the model. However, the predicted average effect of trade openness if a country
was stagnating in t − 1 is -10.57%26, which is a larger negative effect than indicated by
the linear model, and the APE of negative regime changes is predicted as 28.8% across
the entire spell, because the interaction term is dropped. Further, the effect of financial
openness is larger than in the linear case and the APE of the interaction term no longer
has the opposite sign. The model predicts that a unit increase on the Chinn-Ito index
decreases the probability of stagnation by 5.8% if the country was not already stagnating
in the year before and by 6.99% if the country was in a stagnation spell in t− 1.
Further notable differences to the previous results are that now the effects of changes
in the terms of trade, real exchange rate (RER) undervaluation and inequality are all
significant at the 10% level and have increased substantially in absolute size. For example,
a one standard deviation increase in the log difference of the terms of trade in t−1 (which
corresponds to an increase of about 12.6%) decreases the probability of stagnation by
1.5%, a one standard deviation change in the RER index towards more undervaluation
decreases the probability of stagnation by 5.76% and one point increase in the gini index
of inequality27 raises the chances of stagnation by 0.7%. The effect of RER undervaluation
is the largest in economic terms and borders on being significant at the 5%-level, the other
two effects are comparatively small and only appear in parsimonious version of the logit
models. Last, the degree of state-dependence identified by the logit model is somewhat
25We cannot compute the partial effect for the interaction of negative regime changes with the lagged
state, as this variable is dropped from the model.
26This corresponds to the contrast when trade openness changes from 0 to 1 and remains at yi,t−1 = 1,
which has a t-statistic of −1.55 and is thus borderline insignificant at the 10%-level.
27The gini has a range from 0 to 100.
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higher than in the linear approximation; a country that experienced a stagnation spell in
t− 1 has a 32.1% higher probability of being in stagnation year t.
If were to solely rely on the APEs of the interaction effects to test the hypothesis
that some variables have a differential impact on the onset of a stagnation spell than
on its continuation, we would find little evidence in its support based on the logit
models. Nevertheless, while the average interaction effects may not be different from
zero, the interaction effects can still be individually significant for a substantial subset
of observations. To examine the non-linearities of the interaction effects more closely,
Figure 3 graphs the distributions of partial effects for the interaction terms of inflation,
financial openness and trade openness, as well as the associated p-values of a Wald-test
of the null that the interaction effect at each particular observation is zero.
[Figure 3 about here]
Figure 3 clearly shows that all three interaction effects are strongly non-linear. In the
case of inflation, we find that for some observations the partial effect is positive, while
for most observations it is negative and insignificant. The effect is significant only at
negative values for a very small fraction of the distribution (30 observations) and ranges
from -0.95% to 0.39%, which is moderately large compared to an APE of 0.6% when
yi,t−1 = 0. In all graphs, the predicted partial effects group into two families of curves
with an S-shape. The curves at lower probabilities are the partial effects for observations
where yi,t−1 = 0 (symbol: o) and the curves going across higher probabilities are the
predicted effects for observations where yi,t−1 = 1 (symbol: x).
The interaction effect for financial openness is also S-shaped but sloping upwards and
ranges from -6.9% to 7.6%. The partial effect is statistically significant for 14% of the
predicted outcomes at both negative and positive values. However, similarly to inflation,
the large range of insignificant negative and positive values supports the conclusion that
the effect is not different from zero on average. On the contrary, for trade openness the
evidence of a significant interaction is relatively strong. For most observations the partial
effect of the interaction term is positive and very large, with an overall range from -3%
to 30%. Furthermore, for about 32% of the observations in the sample the partial effect
of the interaction term is individually significant at the 5%-level.
To summarize, the fixed-effects logit models generally confirm the findings of the linear
models given a few refinements. Inflation, financial openness, trade openness and negative
regime changes remain significant predictors of stagnation spells. Further, the models
suggest that exchange rate undervaluation, changes in the terms of trade and inequality
affect the probability of stagnation. However, the evidence in favor of interaction effects
with the lagged state for any other variable than trade openness is weak; the models
suggest that only trade openness has a different impact on the onset of a stagnation spell
than its continuation.
[Table 5 about here]
We now turn to the last and final set of estimates. Table 5 presents the results the
random effects probit estimators of the dynamic panel model. For comparison purposes,
we first report the na¨ıve pooled probit version of the fully-interacted dynamic model and
then its random effects counterpart estimated according to the Wooldridge-approach.
Model three is the Wooldridge estimator of the baseline parsimonious specification and
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the last two columns report the APEs of the variables of interest and the corresponding
bootstrapped standard errors.
We report several additional rows in Table 5 to display the regression results more
succinctly. The row “η2-estimated?” refers to whether the Chamberlain-Mundlack time-
averages are included. As these not interesting by themselves, we do not report their
coefficients and partial effects. Similarly, the row “θ-estimated?” reports whether the
interaction terms are included twice, once as an interaction with the lagged state and once
as an interaction with the initial condition. We also do not report the parameter estimates
of the latter, as these are primarily designed to account for the non-random nature of the
initial conditions. Last, as before, all models still include 5-year time dummies to allow
for common period-wise shocks, but their individual parameters are omitted in Table 5.
The comparison between the pooled probit and the random effects probit model
clearly shows that the conclusions that would be derived from these two models are
very different.28 Several parameters exhibit sign changes and substantial changes in
significance levels. More interestingly, even though the Wooldridge estimator of the
dynamic model includes several additional terms and requires the assumption that the
regressors are only correlated with the unobserved heterogeneity through their averages,
the results are remarkably similar to the linear model and previous fixed-effects logit
specification. As before, we interpret only the average partial effects of the parsimonious
specification, but we are not able to also compute the partial effects at the observation-
level as only the APEs across the entire distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity are
identified in these models (see Wooldridge, 2005).
The APE of inflation is larger than in the previous models but remains highly
significant. According to the Wooldridge estimator, a one unit increase in the inflation
index in t−1 translates into 1.5% higher probability of a stagnation spell occurring in year
t, if the country was not in stagnation in t− 1. If the country experienced a stagnation
spell in t− 1, a one unit increase corresponds to a somewhat smaller 1.3% change in the
probability. The APE of the interaction effect is insignificant and small, supporting the
view that inflation increases the chances of stagnation, no matter if this occurs within
or outside of a stagnation spell. Next, the APE of financial openness if yi,t−1 = 0 is
similar to that estimated by the linear probability model, but not statistically significant
in this model. A one unit increase in the Chinn-Ito index towards more openness reduces
the probability of stagnation by about 3.3%. The APE of the interaction term is near
zero (-0.1%) and insignificant, suggesting that there’s no difference between onset and
continuation probabilities.
In the case of trade openness, the results differ substantially. A discrete change
towards openness when yi,t−1 = 0 has an average partial effect of -8.7%, which is smaller
than previous results and not statistically significant. However, the interaction term is
still highly significant and has a very large effect on the predicted probability of stagnation
(18.7%). Adding these two effects, we get the APE for the probability of continued
stagnation if yi,t−1 = 1 and the country is open to trade, which is now positive and
moderately large (10%). These results suggests that trade openness not only has a weaker
effect within a stagnation spell, but that countries that are open to trade are more likely
to continue stagnating than those that are closed, while countries that are closed are
more likely to fall into a stagnation spell.
The confidence interval of the APE of negative regime changes when yi,t−1 = 0 widens
28However, the coefficients of the probit and random effects probit models are scaled differently, so this
comparison is more interesting in terms of relative sizes, signs and significance levels – where appropriate.
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a bit, but the absolute size of the effect is still large and similar to that identified in
the previous models. If a country was not experiencing a stagnation spell t − 1, the
APE is 29.3%, but if it was stagnating in t − 1 and experiencing a negative regime
change, the predicted probability of continuing stagnation is 25.9%. However, the APE
of the interaction term is insignificant by a large margin and much smaller than the
corresponding LPM estimate (-3.4% versus -27.7%).
The RE probit model confirms that RER undervaluation has a large and highly
significant effect on the probability of stagnation. A one standard deviation change
in the undervaluation index reduces the probability of both the onset and continuation of
stagnation by 6%. We cannot corroborate the results from the logit model that changes
in the terms of trade and inequality have a weakly significant effect on the probability
of stagnation, but find weak additional evidence suggesting that institutions reduce the
likelihood of stagnation. Finally, the Wooldridge estimator shows that the degree of
state-dependence is underestimated by both the LPM and FE logit model. If a country
experienced stagnation in the previous year, it is 36.5% more likely to remain stagnating.
In sum, the main results are robust to different specifications, assumptions towards
the unobserved effects, and correlation between the heterogeneity and the country-effects.
Most of the preferred specifications identify the lags of inflation and negative regime
changes as strong predictors of stagnation episodes. Several models also identify trade
openness and financial openness as relevant. The non-linear models mainly add three
additional insights. First, there is less evidence of interaction effects between the lagged
state and the included regressors than the LPM suggests. The interactions are highly
non-linear and vary significantly across the sample, but only in the case of trade openness
we find convincing evidence that its effect differs depending on whether the country was
in stagnation in t− 1 or not. On the contrary, the evidence of interaction effects between
the lagged state and inflation, financial openness or negative regime changes is weak.
Second, the non-linear models show that the value of the real exchange rate matters for
stagnation spells. An overvalued real exchange rate substantially raises the chances of
stagnation, while undervaluation prevents it. Third, the level of state-dependence is still
moderate, but larger than estimated by the linear models with fixed-effects.
We also find that lagging all included regressors by one year to assure that they are
at least contemporaneously exogenous results in identifying very different factors than
if the issue of endogeneity is left unaddressed. For example, Hausmann et al. (2008),
who studied the onset of the stagnation spell we use in this paper, found that exports,
inflation, wars and political transitions matter. Our models and measures are different
than theirs, but we can only confirm their results for inflation and negative regime changes
in particular, as opposed to political transitions in general. Our finding of moderate state-
dependence, however, is potentially consistent with their results on declining hazards.
A key issue in this paper is testing if institutions and various shocks play a role in
determining the onset or continuation of stagnation. Interestingly, apart from the large
effect of negative regime changes, we find little evidence favoring institutional factors and
proxies for shocks. On the contrary, traditional macroeconomics describes the occurrence
of stagnation rather well. While these issues must certainly be explored further, the effect
institutions have on periods of economic stagnation may not fully revealed in these models
for two reasons. First, macroeconomic policy is likely to be endogenous to a country’s
institutions and the slow-moving effects of institutions may not be well-identified in panel
studies such as this one. Second, the included measures may also characterize institutions
insufficiently, leaving their true effect hidden in the unobserved heterogeneity.
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7 Conclusion
This paper analyzed the incidence of stagnation episodes as a dynamic problem and
asked if stagnation spells are determined by institutional factors, various shocks and
macroeconomic factors. While the literature has examined the determinants of onset and
duration of different episodes separately, we argue that there are few reasons to assume
that these are different ex ante. We explicitly examine the hypothesis that the effects
of variables on onset of stagnation and continuation are different. Building on a recent
contribution by Hausmann et al. (2008), we define stagnation spells as episodes in which
GDP per capita is below previously achieved levels. We then used fixed-effects linear
models, GMM, fixed-effects logit and dynamic random effects probit to assess the role of
institutions, shocks and economic factors, as well as to determine if any of these elements
have a different effect on the onset and the continuation of a stagnation spell.
We identify several factors that predict the occurrence of stagnation spells. On the
negative side, adverse regime changes have the single largest effect on the incidence of
stagnation spells and higher inflation raises the chances of stagnation. More surprisingly,
we find that real exchange rate undervaluation, financial openness and trade openness
help reduce the chances of stagnation. Additionally, we find strong evidence indicating
that trade openness primarily protects against falling into stagnation, but that this effect
vanishes or possibly changes signs once a stagnation spell has begun. For all other
variables there is no or only weak evidence of a differential impact on onset versus
continuation, but these effects vary strongly across the distribution of outcomes (i.e.
among individual countries). In most cases, we cannot confirm the hypothesis that there
is a different impact on the first occurrence of stagnation than on continued stagnation.
Many of these results are consistent with findings of the previous literature on growth
spells and panel studies of growth rates, i.e. the effect of inflation, financial openness,
and the moderate degree of state-dependence (e.g. Hausmann et al., 2008; Reddy and
Minoiu, 2009). Three findings stand out. Negative regime changes were previously linked
to the onset of growth accelerations (Hausmann et al., 2005), but our findings reveal
the more intuitive result that they strongly predict stagnation episodes. Trade openness
has been shown to affect growth rates (Wacziarg and Welch, 2008), growth accelerations
(Hausmann et al., 2005) and the duration of positive growth spells (Berg et al., 2011); we
find it also prevents the onset of stagnation spells but affects their incidence non-linearly.
Further, Rodrik (2008) shows that an undervalued exchange rate positively affects growth
rates, to which we add that undervaluation also helps to avert stagnation spells.
Interestingly, we cannot confirm two central results of the previous literature. First,
we find little evidence that, in addition to negative regime changes, institutions generally
affect the incidence of stagnation spells. Second, contrary to previous evidence (Rodrik,
1999; Hausmann et al., 2008), we do not find that chances in real exports or terms of
trade affect the chances of stagnation. Both effects are absent as we lag the independent
variables to assure that they are contemporaneously exogenous. Especially, the former
suggests that we cannot confirm the hypothesis that institutions and internal/external
shocks determine the propensity of stagnation, as – inter alia – suggested by North
et al. (2009). However, it is worth highlighting that this paper represents one way of
looking at the data and of examining the underlying problem. Future work that uses
more differentiated measures for institutions and additional techniques for dealing with
endogeneity but continues to investigate differences between onset and continuation would
add further insights to the results presented here.
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Appendix A
Figure 1 – Examples of growth episodes: Angola and France
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Figure 3 – Partial Effects of Interaction Terms in Logit Model
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Table 1 – Growth episodes by income levels in 2007 and 1960
% Country-years in ... Low Low-Mid Mid-High High Total
Panel A: Income Level 2007
Expansion 22.12 41.33 54.97 73.14 48.31
Stagnation 77.88 58.67 45.03 26.86 51.69
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Expansion (above 5%) 10.21 11.52 23.18 22.66 16.99
Expansion (5% or less) 11.91 29.81 31.79 50.49 31.32
Crisis 49.90 30.63 23.81 17.42 30.18
Recovery 27.98 28.04 21.22 9.44 21.51
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Panel B: Income Level 1960
Expansion 41.45 40.96 46.37 70.23 50.18
Stagnation 58.55 59.04 53.63 29.77 49.82
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Expansion (above 5%) 17.87 20.82 17.56 14.07 17.51
Expansion (5% or less) 23.59 20.14 28.81 56.16 32.67
Crisis 34.80 35.32 28.74 19.35 29.32
Recovery 23.74 23.72 24.89 10.42 20.50
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Notes: 51 countries in 1951, 127 countries in 2007, total number of observations 6,338 (Panel A) and
5,467 (Panel B), percentages calculated on the basis of all years between 1951 and 2007.
Source(s): based on Penn World Tables 6.3.
Table 2 – Growth episodes by institutional indicators
% Country-years in ... Low Low-Mid Mid-High High Total
Panel A: Formalization of regulations
Expansion 30.49 40.92 54.61 76.41 51.06
Stagnation 69.51 59.08 45.39 23.59 48.94
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Expansion (above 5%) 14.49 16.15 20.86 18.38 17.47
Expansion (5% or less) 16.00 24.78 33.75 58.03 33.60
Crisis 40.29 37.13 21.80 14.51 28.29
Recovery 29.22 21.95 23.59 9.08 20.65
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Panel B: Control and intervention
Expansion 54.98 68.17 50.56 30.55 51.06
Stagnation 45.02 31.83 49.44 69.45 48.94
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Expansion (above 5%) 25.36 13.77 20.68 11.67 17.47
Expansion (5% or less) 29.62 54.40 29.87 18.88 33.60
Crisis 26.81 18.13 28.39 39.96 28.29
Recovery 18.21 13.70 21.05 29.49 20.65
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Notes: 47 countries in 1951, 107 countries in 2007, total number of observations 5,405 (Panel A and
Panel B), percentages calculated on the basis of all years between 1951 and 2007.
Source(s): based on Penn World Tables 6.3 and de Crombrugghe and Farla (2011).
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Table 4 – Logit Models – Probability of Stagnation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent Variable Logit CML S.E. Logit CML S.E. Logit ML S.E. APEs S.E.
Log GDP/c(t−1) 0.417 0.707 0.430 0.695 0.430 0.738 0.058 0.099
Inflation(t−1) 0.037 0.025 0.043 0.026 0.046 0.028 0.006* 0.004
∆ ToT(t−1) -0.556 0.571 -0.828* 0.479 -0.885* 0.516 -0.119* 0.070
∆ Real Exports(t−1) -0.784 1.163 -0.621 0.735 -0.681 0.795 -0.091 0.107
RER Value(t−1) -1.375** 0.567 -0.957* 0.503 -1.020* 0.533 -0.137* 0.071
Fin. Openness(t−1) -0.453*** 0.121 -0.396*** 0.110 -0.421*** 0.118 -0.058*** 0.016
Trade Openness(t−1) -1.441*** 0.486 -1.424*** 0.456 -1.527*** 0.489 -0.259*** 0.091
Inequality(t−1) -0.050 0.031 -0.052* 0.029 -0.054* 0.030 -0.007* 0.004
Polity2(t−1) -0.066 0.044 -0.051 0.033 -0.054 0.036 -0.007 0.005
Regchange +(t−1) 0.193 0.561 0.129 0.376 0.136 0.397 0.018 0.054
Regchange −(t−1) 2.102** 0.900 1.945** 0.938 2.038** 0.991 0.288** 0.135
Leader Exit(t−1) -0.501 0.426 -0.060 0.317 -0.058 0.334 -0.007 0.044
War/Conflict(t−1) 0.115 0.382 -0.428 0.342 -0.454 0.357 -0.059 0.045
Log GDP/c(t−1) · Y(t−1) 0.082 0.284
Inflation(t−1) · Y(t−1) -0.012 0.012 -0.019 0.015 -0.021 0.016 -0.002 0.002
∆ ToT(t−1) · Y(t−1) -1.128 1.025
∆ Real Exports(t−1) · Y(t−1) 0.290 1.244
RER Value(t−1) · Y(t−1) 0.859 0.624
Fin. Openness(t−1) · Y(t−1) 0.144 0.117 0.045 0.107 0.045 0.116 -0.011 0.022
Trade Openness(t−1) · Y(t−1) 0.947* 0.528 0.885* 0.487 0.939* 0.521 0.153 0.094
Inequality(t−1) · Y(t−1) 0.003 0.019
Polity2(t−1) · Y(t−1) 0.013 0.042
Regchange +(t−1) · Y(t−1) -0.164 0.620
Leader Exit(t−1) · Y(t−1) 0.833* 0.506
War/Conflict(t−1) · Y(t−1) -1.051* 0.537
Y(t−1) -0.004 2.813 1.189*** 0.456 1.282*** 0.487 0.321*** 0.029
1970 - 1974 (b. 95-99) -0.760 0.628 -0.756 0.622 -0.806 0.656
1975 - 1979 (b. 95-99) -1.059* 0.541 -1.097** 0.542 -1.182** 0.574
1980 - 1984 (b. 95-99) -0.248 0.469 -0.265 0.459 -0.302 0.486
1985 - 1989 (b. 95-99) -0.551 0.371 -0.544 0.354 -0.582 0.375
1990 - 1994 (b. 95-99) 0.139 0.264 0.126 0.272 0.130 0.287
2000 - 2004 (b. 95-99) 0.343 0.263 0.368 0.258 0.376 0.276
Observations 1314 1314 1314 1314
Country FE YES YES YES YES
Clustered Errors [Country] YES YES YES YES
Countries 62 62 62 62
Log-pseudolikelihood -465.864 -469.311 -555.547 -555.547
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: In all models Regchange +(t−1) · Y(t−1) is dropped and 10 observations not used, because ! = 0 predicts success
perfectly. Standard errors of the APEs are computed using the delta method (see Appendix B).
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Table 5 – Probit Models – Probability of Stagnation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent Variable Probit S.E. Woold S.E. Woold S.E. APEs S.E.
Log GDP/c(t−1) 0.027 0.103 0.862** 0.392 0.486 0.371 0.100 0.076
Inflation(t−1) 0.017*** 0.006 0.055*** 0.014 0.060*** 0.014 0.015*** 0.003
∆ ToT(t−1) -0.328 0.300 -0.160 0.512 -0.278 0.351 -0.057 0.072
∆ Real Exports(t−1) -0.226 0.540 -0.094 0.677 -0.347 0.359 -0.071 0.074
RER Value(t−1) -0.719*** 0.202 -1.164*** 0.333 -0.607** 0.283 -0.124** 0.058
Fin. Openness(t−1) -0.056 0.039 -0.209** 0.083 -0.136 0.083 -0.033 0.020
Trade Openness(t−1) -0.567*** 0.217 -0.415 0.268 -0.335 0.262 -0.087 0.072
Inequality(t−1) 0.014** 0.007 -0.009 0.017 -0.021 0.016 -0.004 0.003
Polity2(t−1) -0.014 0.013 -0.035 0.022 -0.031* 0.016 -0.006* 0.003
Regchange +(t−1) 0.039 0.269 0.190 0.424 0.057 0.225 0.012 0.046
Regchange −(t−1) 1.074* 0.557 1.216** 0.607 1.105* 0.589 0.293* 0.154
Leader Exit(t−1) -0.196 0.188 -0.058 0.252 -0.028 0.173 -0.006 0.035
War/Conflict(t−1) 0.110 0.257 -0.087 0.398 -0.135 0.249 -0.028 0.051
Log GDP/c(t−1) · Y(t−1) -0.259 0.182 -0.245 0.160
Inflation(t−1) · Y(t−1) -0.008 0.006 -0.001 0.008 -0.008 0.008 -0.002 0.002
∆ ToT(t−1) · Y(t−1) -0.091 0.393 0.770 0.995
∆ Real Exports(t−1) · Y(t−1) -0.435 0.574 0.429 0.776
RER Value(t−1) · Y(t−1) 0.635 0.390 0.427 0.317
Fin. Openness(t−1) · Y(t−1) 0.096 0.060 0.119 0.081 0.001 0.069 -0.001 0.017
Trade Openness(t−1) · Y(t−1) 0.474 0.321 0.852*** 0.276 0.720*** 0.251 0.187*** 0.066
Inequality(t−1) · Y(t−1) 0.005 0.012 0.015 0.011
Polity2(t−1) · Y(t−1) 0.008 0.022 0.022 0.021
Regchange +(t−1) · Y(t−1) 0.166 0.284 0.158 0.600
Regchange −(t−1) · Y(t−1) 2.960 1,917 2.851 1,186 -0.034 0.288
Leader Exit(t−1) · Y(t−1) 0.290 0.259 0.393 0.307
War/Conflict(t−1) · Y(t−1) -0.267 0.404 -0.754* 0.453
Y0 4.588** 2.064 1.521*** 0.329 – –
Y(t−1) 3.407* 1.787 2.212 1.612 0.858*** 0.242 0.365*** 0.034
Constant -1.287 1.105 -5.499** 2.316 -2.483 1.980 – –
Observations 1586 1596 1596 1596
γ-estimated? NO YES YES YES
θ-estimated? NO YES YES YES
5-Year FE YES YES YES YES
Countries 90 90 90 90
Pseudo-R2 0.423 0.280 0.259 0.259
Log-likelihood -632.218 -576.711 -593.479 -593.479
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: In the first model Regchange −(t−1) ·Y(t−1) is dropped and 10 observations not used, because ! = 0 predicts success
perfectly. The asymptotic standard errors of the APEs were derived via the Delta Method (see Appendix B).
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Table A.1 – Independent Variables, Description, Construction and Sources
Name Description Construction Data Source
Log GDP/c(t−1) Logarithm of GDP per capita ln(RGDPCHi,t−1) PWT 6.3
Inflation(t−1) Change in consumer prices 100 · ln(1 + [gCPIi,t−1]) IFS & WDIa
∆ ToT(t−1) Change in terms of trade ln(TOTi,t−1)− ln(TOTi,t−2) WDI & IFSb
∆ Real Exports(t−1) Change in exports volumes ln(EXPi,t−1)− ln(EXPi,t−2) WDI & IFSc
RER Value(t−1) Real exchange rate valuation see noted PWT 6.3
Fin. Openness(t−1) Capital account openness KAOPENi,t−1 Chinn-Ito ’09
Trade Openness(t−1) Trade liberalization measure 1 if open in t− 1 W-W ’08
Inequality(t−1) Gini coefficient for income GINIi,t−1 Solt ’09
Polity2(t−1) Revised combined polity score DEMOCi,t−1−AUTOCi,t−1 Polity IV
Regchange +(t−1) Positive regime change based on REGTRANSi,t−1e Polity IV
Regchange −(t−1) Negative regime change based on REGTRANSi,t−1e Polity IV
Leader Exit(t−1) Irregular exit of leader 1 if EXITi,t−1 6= 1g Archigos 2.9
War/Conflict(t−1) Conflicts (≥ 1000 deaths) see notef UCDP/PRIO
a We use the IFS series (CPI y-o-y %-change based on line 64) as a benchmark and append it with the
WDI series in 59 cases where the former has missing data.
b We use the WDI series as a benchmark (which comprises of UNCTAD and IFS data) and append it
with the export volume index from the IFS for missing years/countries.
c From the WDI 2011, we use the series ‘net barter terms of trade’, and from the IFS, we derive the
equivalent net barter terms of trade by dividing the unit value of exports (line 74) by the unit value
of imports (line 75) and multiplying the result by 100. We then append the WDI series of growth
rates with the growth rates from the IFS series whenever the former has missing information.
d Rodrik (2008) proposes a simple way to calculate an index of “real” exchange rate (RER)
overvaluation based only on the Penn World Tables. The method involves three steps. (1) compute the
PPP-adjusted exchange rate: ln(RERit) = ln(XRATit/PPPit). (2) Estimate the Balassa-Samuelson
effect: ln(RERit) = α+β ln(RGDPCHit)+γt+εit. (3) Take the difference between the actual RER
and the predicted RER from (2), hence: RER Value(i,t−1) = ln(RER(i,t−1)− ln( ̂RERi,t−1).
e We use the Polity IV variable REGTRANS to identify regime changes in either direction based on
a minimum 3-point change in a country’s democracy or autocracy score. We exclude the code 0 for
“minor changes”, which denotes any change in the democracy or autocracy scores. Further, we do
not code -77 for “interregna”, -66 for (foreign) “interruptions” and -88 for regime “transitions” as
negative regime changes to avoid collinearity with the leader exit and war/conflict dummies.
f This dummy is constructed based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2011, 1946– 2010.
We first converted the conflict-year database into country-year format and then coded the intensity
levels for the highest intensity conflict in any given country-year. The dummy is unity if the intensity
level of the conflict was coded as 2 in t− 1 and the country was listed as a location of the conflict.
g The Archigos 2.9 time-series database records entries, tenure and exits of country leaders and the
conditions on which they entered and exited. In some instances there are multiple observations per
country-year, in such an event we code an irregular exit if any one observation within that year is
identified as “irregular”. Irregular exit refers to leaders that died in office, committed suicide, or left
office due to ill health, other irregular means or the deposition by another state.
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Appendix B
Partial effects in non-linear models
Contrary to linear models, partial effects in a non-linear model are not constant. Precisely
because the relationship is non-linear, the derivative at any point depends on the value
of the function at that point. For example:
∂F (xβ)
∂xk
=
∂F (xβ)
∂xβ
· ∂xβ
∂xk
= F ′(∂xβ)βk (1)
This relationship is most commonly summarized by the partial effect at the mean, partial
effect at a representative value, or the average partial effect (APE). Increasingly, the APE
is becoming the standard measure; it is defined as:
APE(βk) = N
−1
N∑
i=1
F ′(∂xβ)βk (2)
The calculus method is not the most appropriate if xk ∈ x is a dummy variable. In this
case, a finite difference method for a change from zero to unity should be applied:
APE(βk) = N
−1
N∑
i=1
[F (xβ|xk = 1)− F (xβ|xk = 0)] (3)
However, as Ai and Norton (2003) pointed out, the coefficient of an interaction term in
non-linear models does not reveal the sign, size and significance of the interaction effect.
To see this, consider a simple binary model with one interaction term:
P (yi = 1) = F (u) = F (β0 + β1xi + β2zi + β12xizi) (4)
In linear functions the partial effect is the coefficient β12, but only because in the linear
case β12 corresponds to the cross-partial derivative
∂
∂zi
(∂F (u)
∂xi
) = ∂
2F (u)
∂xi∂zi
of F (u).
Applying the cross-partial derivative to the non-linear function F (u) yields:
∂2F (u)
∂xi∂zi
=
∂[(β1 + β12zi)F
′(u)]
∂zi
= β12F
′(u) + (β1 + β12zi)(β2 + β12xi)F ′′(u) (5)
From (5) it is easy to see that β12 is not equal to the interaction effect. Instead, the
true effect is given in (5) and often involves a numerical approximation for F ′′(·) if the
interacted variables are both continuous.
The correct interpretation/estimation of interaction effects is still debated in the
econometric literature. For example, Puhani (2012) shows that in ‘difference-in-difference’
models the cross-difference does not correspond to the treatment effect, but acknowledges
that in many other applications cross-differences are in fact the parameters of interest.
Greene (2010) illustrates that cross-derivatives include a functional form factor which
makes them non-zero even in the absence of a significant interaction effect and suggests
ways to graphically examine interactions. Nevertheless, Greene (2010) also notes that in
the case of continuous by categorical interactions the difference in derivatives can be used
to test the significance of a regime switch. In this application, we are precisely interested
in differences in probabilities due to regime switches (in yi,t−1).
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Partial Effects: Fixed Effects Logit
The fixed-effects (conditional) logit estimator generally does not permit the computation
of partial effects, as the unobserved heterogeneity (µi) is conditioned out of the estimated
likelihood function. In our application, we showed that the results from the conditional
logit and the unconditional logit with dummy fixed-effects are rather similar. Hence,
we use the results of the dummy variables fixed effects logit model to approximate two
types of partial effects: the individual partial effects and APEs. Since estimates of partial
effects for non-interacted variables are straightforward to derive, we only illustrate how
we estimate the partial effects and associated standard errors of interaction terms.
Consider a simplification of our basic dynamic model with one explanatory variable,
the lagged state, an interaction term and fixed effects:
F (β0 + xitβ1 + β2yi,t−1 + xityi,t−1β12 + µi) (6)
where F (·) is the cumulative logistic distribution: F (u) = eu/(1 + eu).
If xit is continuous and yi,t−1 were continuous, then the partial effect of β12 is the cross
derivative of F (·) with respect to x and yi,t−1 as shown before. However, since yi,t−1 is
binary, the interaction effect is estimated using differences in partial derivatives:
∆(∂F (u)/∂xit)
∆yi,t−1
=
∆[(β1 + β12yi,t−1)F ′(u)]
∆yi,t−1
= (β1 + β12)F
′(β0 + β1xit + β2 + β12xit + µi)− β1F ′(β0 + β1xit + µi)
If xit is also binary, we use double differences:
∆2F (u)
∆xit∆yi,t−1
=
∆[F (u|xit = 1)− F (u|xit = 0]
∆yi,t−1
= F (u|xit = 1, yi,t−1 = 1)− F (u|xit = 1, yi,t−1 = 0)
−F (u|xit = 0, yi,t−1 = 1) + F (u|xit = 0, yi,t−1 = 0)
From these observation specific partial effects, we can easily compute the APE of the
interaction term as follows:
APE(β12) = N
−1
N∑
i=1
∆(∂F (u)/∂xit)
∆yi,t−1
(7)
where ∂ denotes either partial derivatives or differences depending on if the
corresponding variable xit is discrete or continuous.
The standard errors of the APEs are derived using the delta method (Greene, 2011,
pp. 696–699), which approximates the asymptotic variance as:
V̂ar[APE(β̂12)] = GVˆ [β̂]G
′
where G = N−1
N∑
i=1
∂
∂β̂′
(
∆(∂F (u|β = β̂))
∂xit∆yi,t−1
)
(8)
where Vˆ is the estimated asymptotic covariance matrix of β̂. For the individual
partial effects, the Jacobian vectors are observation-specific and not averaged over N .
This approach can easily be extended to account for more complex interactions as they
appear in this paper, only the derivatives/differences require more computations.
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Partial Effects: Dynamic Random Effects Probit
Wooldridge (2005) shows that in the dynamic random effects probit model, a consistent
and
√
N -asymptotically normal estimator of the APEs of time-varying variables is
available. The effects of time-invariant covariates are not identified. Using the same
assumptions as in Section 5.3, we can write the expectation as:
E[Φ(x′tβ + ρyi,t−1 + µi)] = E[Φ(x
′
tβ + ρyi,t−1 + η0 + η1yi0 + x¯
′
iη2 + ui)] (9)
where xt denotes time-varying regressors and x¯i their time-averages. The expectation
runs over the distribution of (yi0, x¯i, ui), but we do not estimate parameters for µi or ui.
Following Wooldridge (2005), we can get rid of the unobserved effects by applying the
law of iterated expectations:
E[E[Φ(x′tβ + ρyi,t−1 + η0 + η1yi0 + x¯
′
iη2 + ui)|yi0, x¯i]] =
E[Φ[(x′tβ + ρyi,t−1 + η0 + η1yi0 + x¯
′
iη2) · (1 + σ2u)−1/2]] (10)
Given the assumptions that ui ∼ N(0, σ2u) and eit ∼ N(0, 1), the scaled parameters
in (10) are exactly the coefficients that standard random effects probit estimates; we can
thus write their descaled counterparts more succinctly as Φ(x′tβu+ρuyi,t−1+ηu,0+ηu,1yi0+
x¯′iηu,2). Putting these together, we have eliminated the group-specific unobserved effects
and can rewrite (9) as:
E[Φ(x′tβ + ρyi,t−1 + µi)] = E[Φ(x
′
tβu + ρuyi,t−1 + ηu0 + ηu,1yi0 + x¯
′
iηu,2] (11)
A consistent estimator of this expectation is the simple average across all observations
(N−1
∑N
i=1 . . .). The derivative of this function with respect to a continuous time-varying
regressor, or the finite difference for a binary regressor, is equivalent to the APE of that
variable. This approach can be extended to include interactions with the lagged state
and other non-linearities. Wooldridge’s device to get to the APEs is to always average
across the distribution of (yi0, x¯i) first and then to specify the derivatives/differences. For
example, the APE of a continuous variable (without an interaction term) in xt is:
APE(βk) = N
−1
N∑
i=1
φ(x′tβu + ρuyi,t−1 + ηu,0 + ηu,1yi0 + x¯
′
iηu,2)βu,k (12)
where φ is the probability density function of the standard normal cdf.
The APEs of interaction terms are derived using double differences or differences in
partial derivatives. In all cases, the standard errors are computed using the delta method
as in defined in (8) of the previous section. We specify analytic differences in derivatives
or double differences for the interaction effects, while the observation specific Jacobian
vectors with respect to the coefficient-vector are computed numerically.
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